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I. INTRODUCTION1
A. Preface
The mineral lease is the basic development contract utilized in the oil
and gas industry in Louisiana. It is, as noted by one court, “the most
common vehicle used to obtain development of lands for oil, gas, and other
minerals . . . .”2
Under the Louisiana Mineral Code, a “mineral lease is a contract by
which the lessee is granted the right to explore for and produce minerals.”3
It is a “real right”4 and “an incorporeal immovable” that “is alienable and
heritable.”5
The mineral lease grants the lessee the legal right and authority, for a
term of time, to enter a tract of land and conduct operations on such land
for the exploration and production of oil, gas, or other minerals, and to
produce such minerals as might be discovered.

Copyright 2017, by PATRICK S. OTTINGER.
* Ottinger Hebert, L.L.C., Lafayette, Louisiana; Member, Louisiana and
Texas Bars; Adjunct Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
1. Portions of this article are an adaptation of material contained in PATRICK
S. OTTINGER, LOUISIANA MINERAL LEASES: A TREATISE (2016) [hereinafter
OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE].
2. Mire v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 285 F. Supp. 885, 888 (W.D. La. 1968).
3. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:114 (1975).
4. Id. at § 31:16.
5. Id. at § 31:18.
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No one undertakes the cost, risk, and expense of drilling a well without
the fervent hope and anticipation that production will be obtained in
commercial quantities. To be sure, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
articulated “the main consideration of a mineral lease is the development of
the leased premises for minerals.”6
Concomitantly, it is understood that “[r]ent is, from the standpoint of
the lessor, the primary motive for the contract . . . .”7
When the lessee’s exploration and production (E&P) efforts are
successful,8 and oil or gas is produced from or attributable to the leased
premises, the production of such minerals gives rise to the obligation on the
part of the lessee to pay royalties to its lessor and the other parties entitled
thereto.9 The “Royalty Clause” of the mineral lease regulates this critical
matter.10
In the broadest sense of the word, a “royalty” is the right to participate
in the profits of an entrepreneurial undertaking. A well-known concept in
the commercial arena, it is usually free of costs to the holder of the royalty
interest.11
The Louisiana Mineral Code defines “royalty, as used in connection
with mineral leases, [as] any interest in production, or its value, from or
attributable to land subject to a mineral lease, that is deliverable or payable
to the lessor or others entitled to share therein.”12
Both lessors and lessees alike would benefit from an examination of the
issues involved in calculating the lessor’s royalty payment. The physical
laws pertaining to temperature, gravity, and volume and the practice and
operation of pipelines are universal and not state-specific. Therefore, while
the laws and customs of Louisiana are the central focus of this article,
consideration is also given to decisions in other states when the issue has not
been taken up by a court applying the law of the Bayou State.13
6. Carter v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 36 So. 2d 26, 28 (La. 1948).
7. Melancon v. Texas Co., 89 So. 2d 135, 142 (La. 1956).
8. “E&P” means “exploration and production.”
9. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-25(d)(2).
10. See id. at § 4-25.
11. Portions of this section were taken from PATRICK S. OTTINGER, Mineral
Royalties, in LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW TREATISE, ch. 5 (Patrick H. Martin, ed.,
2012) [hereinafter OTTINGER, Mineral Royalties].
12. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213(5) (1983).
13. “Although the decisions of other jurisdictions are not controlling on the
Courts of Louisiana, if they determine an issue practically identical with the one
under consideration, they possess at least a persuasive effect and merit attention.”
C H F Fin. Co. v. Jochum, 127 So. 2d 534, 539 (La. 1961). See also OTTINGER,
MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 3-03.
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B. Basic Formula for the Calculation of the Lessor’s Royalty Payment
Illustrative of the fact that, at its base, a royalty payment is calculated
by applying the principles of mathematics, each topic or issue examined
herein contributes a component part of the basic mathematical formula.
In the simplest of terms, the basic formula for calculation of a royalty
payment to a lessor under a mineral lease is as follows:
[Quantity of Product in Measured Units of Product,
times Price per Unit of Product,
times Lessor’s Fractional Interest in Minerals, or 1.0, if Entire,
times Lessor’s Royalty Interest],14
minus [Permitted Deductions or Other Withholdings, if any],15
times [Lessor’s Unit Participation Interest, or 1.0, if a “Lease
Basis” Well].16
Each of these component parts is essential to understand the
methodology by which a lessor’s royalty payment is calculated, and each
is examined in greater detail herein. As seen in this basic formula, there
are components that contribute to the determination of a gross royalty
payment (those involving multiplication); factors that serve to reduce that
gross number to a net royalty payment (those involving subtraction); and
a final component to reduce the net royalty payment to be attributable to
the lessor’s unitized tract, if such exists.
However, as in all matters, the “devil is in the details.” Various issues,
factors, or considerations might bear upon these discrete components, thus
making the ultimate mathematical calculation anything but simple. Hence,
this seemingly basic formulation can entail an array of components, while
certain elements might not be presented.17 The calculation of a lessor’s
royalty payment involves “much more than mere math.”18

14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. For example, the pertinent mineral lease might contain a “No Deductions
Clause” that disallows the assessment of “post-production costs” by the lessee.
See infra Part III.B.
18. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-25(d)(5).
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C. The Lessee’s Duty to Pay Royalty, and the Time for Payment
The courts of Louisiana have long embraced the notion that, under a
mineral lease, royalties on production constitute “rent.”19 This notion is
contained in article 123 of the Louisiana Mineral Code, which provides
that “royalties paid to the lessor on production are rent.”20
Article 123 of the Mineral Code further stipulates that a “mineral
lessee is obligated to make timely payment of rent according to the terms
of the contract or the custom of the mining industry in question if the
contract is silent.”21
The commercially printed forms of mineral leases in prevalent use in
Louisiana contain no provision relative to the due date for the payment of
royalties under a mineral lease. A “sophisticated lessor” (explained in Part
I.D.2 hereof) might include in its mineral lease a special clause addressing
the timing of payments to be made by the lessee and might also specify
any duty to pay interest in the event that payments are not made when
due.22
While it is the personal responsibility of the lessee to make royalty
payments to its lessor, it does occur that the purchaser of production might,
by agreement, undertake that duty on behalf of the lessee-seller of
production. As noted in the following case, such an undertaking does not
relieve the lessee of its paramount responsibility; it is also true, however,
that a lessor must accept performance from anyone.23
In Bailey v. Franks Petroleum Inc.,24 the defendant-lessee sold
condensate production to Scurlock Oil Company. Under its division order
with the purchaser, Franks and Scurlock agreed that “Scurlock would
purchase the condensate production and assume Franks’ obligation to pay
petitioners their royalty interest under the [mineral] lease.”25 Gas and
19. See Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 57 So. 2d 679, 682 (La. 1952)
(“Under this application of the law, it was inevitable that when the question arose
as to the nature of royalty, it was held to be rent in the form of a portion of the
produce of the land . . . .”).
20. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:123 (1975).
21. Id.
22. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at §§ 416(d)(4)(vi)(B), 5-16, 13-08(i).
23. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1855 (2017) (“Performance may be rendered by
a third person, even against the will of the obligee, unless the obligor or the
obligee has an interest in performance only by the obligor.”).
24. 479 So. 2d 563 (La. Ct. App. 1985). In the interest of full disclosure, your
author represented the defendant-lessee in this suit.
25. Id. at 565.
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condensate were produced for some eight or nine years, but Scurlock did
not pay royalties to the landowners, presumably because the landowners
failed or refused to sign a division order. Scurlock did, however, pay to
the operator its proportionate share of the net revenue on condensate that
Scurlock purchased.
After a routine audit, the landowners discovered that condensate was
being reported by the operator to the Office of Conservation, but there was
no evidence of actual payment to the lessor of royalties on such condensate.
After written demand upon Franks, which in turn made immediate demand
upon Scurlock, the latter promptly paid the accrued royalties to the
landowners within thirty days of receipt of the written notice. The landowners
then sued Franks, their lessee, for royalties due, penalties, interest, and
attorney’s fees, subject to a credit for royalties paid by Scurlock. Franks, in
turn, brought Scurlock into the suit as a third-party defendant.
The trial court held for the lessors against their lessee, Franks, and also
held for Franks against its purchaser of production, Scurlock. In so holding,
the trial court “found that Franks was not relieved of liability to plaintiffs by
the sale of condensate production to Scurlock because plaintiffs did not sign
the division order sent by Scurlock.”26
The appellate court affirmed the holding but reversed the trial court’s
finding that “the nonpayment of royalties for such a prolonged period of
time constituted gross negligence which was tantamount to willful failure to
pay royalties.”27 The appellate court found that the “nonpayment of royalties
was due to negligence,” not “willful nonpayment.”28 The appellate court
further noted: “the record supports that Scurlock assumed Franks’
obligations, negligently failed to pay royalties, and thereby rendered Franks
liable on the lease.”29
D. Obtaining Information in Support of the Royalty Payment
The discerning royalty owner will not tend to take the amount of the
royalty payment, as represented by the lessee’s check, “at face value.” It will
wish to “look under the hood” of the payment so as to understand its
calculative methodology.
Particularly where the royalty owner anticipated (justifiably or not) a
significantly greater check, commodity prices varied greatly, or production
was declining, the royalty owner will seek to inform itself as to the manner
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 566.
Id.
Id. at 567.
Id.
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in which the royalty payment was calculated. There are conceivably
several sources for this information, including the check stub, the
sophisticated lease, online requests, and direct requests to the lessee.
1. The Check Stub
The first place to which a lessor might turn in order to ascertain the
manner in which its royalty payment has been calculated is the “check
stub” that accompanies the royalty check.30
Article 212.31 of the Louisiana Mineral Code was added in 1983 and
provides for a “check stub,” stating as follows:
Art. 212.31. Payment information to interest owners
A. As used in this Article:
(1) “Check stub” means the financial record attached to a check.
(2) “Division order” means a contract of sale to the purchaser of oil
or gas directing the purchaser to make payment for the value of the
products taken in the proportions set out in the division order, which
division order is prepared by the purchaser on the basis of the
ownership shown in the title opinion prepared after examination of
the abstracts and which is executed by the operator, the royalty
owners, and the other persons having an interest in the production.31
(3) “Interest owner” means a person owning a royalty interest or a
working interest in an oil or gas well or unit.
B. Whenever payment is made for oil or gas production to an
interest owner, whether pursuant to a division order, lease, servitude,
or other agreement, all of the following information shall be included
on the check stub or on an attachment to the form of payment, unless
the information is otherwise provided on a regular basis:
(1) Lease identification number, if any, or reference to appropriate
agreement with identification of the well or unit from which
production is attributed.
30. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 1-26(k).
31. Inexplicably, this definition of a “division order” differs from the
definition contained in Mineral Code article 138.1A (“[A] ‘division order’ is an
instrument setting forth the proportional ownership in oil or gas, or the value
thereof, which division order is prepared after examination of title and which is
executed by the owners of the production or other persons having authority to act
on behalf of the owners thereof.”). See also OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE
TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 3-30.
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(2) Month and year of sales or purchases included in the payment.
(3) Total barrels of crude oil or MCF of gas purchased.
(4) Owner’s final realizable price per barrel or MCF.
(5) Total amount of severance and other production taxes, with
the exception of windfall profit tax.32
(6) Net value of total sales from the property after taxes are
deducted.
(7) Interest owner’s interest, expressed as a decimal fraction, in
production from (1) above.
(8) Interest owner’s share of the total value of sales prior to any
tax deductions.
(9) Interest owner’s share of the sales value less his share of the
production and severance taxes, as applicable.33
Article 212.31B, in explicit, straightforward terms, mandates that a
check stub be included with a lessor’s royalty check by providing that,
“[w]henever payment is made for oil or gas production to an interest
owner, . . . pursuant to a . . . lease,” a check stub should accompany the
payment. As noted, the article specifies the required content of a check
stub, “unless the information is otherwise provided on a regular basis.”
While it is mandatory that the lessee-payor include a check stub,
nothing in the article addresses the consequences of non-compliance.34
The failure of the lessee to include a check stub should not give rise to an
action for the breach of the mineral lease, since the duty to provide the
data is statutorily, rather than contractually, grounded. As a general
proposition, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the

32. The Windfall Profits Tax was enacted in 1980, and imposed a higher tax
rate on profits received by the oil industry as a result of the decontrol of oil prices.
Having been repealed in 1988, this reference is meaningless as such tax does not
currently exist.
33. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:212.31 (1984).
34. By way of contrast, the Texas counterpart to Louisiana’s check stub
statute added a private cause of action in 2002, permitting a lessor to make a
complaint as to the lessee’s non-compliance with the strictures of the statute. See
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.507 (West 2002). “Without an enforcement
mechanism, Payors did not face any direct liability to the royalty owner for failure
to provide the required information. With the addition of Section 91.507, royalty
owners may now bring a civil action against a Payor to enforce the provisions of
Section 91.504 concerning information about payment deductions and adjustments,
heating value and lease identification.” Allen D. Cummings, Today’s Marketing,
Yesterday’s Leases, Check Stub Statutes: The Perfect Storm?, Univ. of Tex. School
of Law 30th Ann. Ernest E. Smith Oil, Gas and Mineral Law Inst. (2004).
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violation of a statute imposing mandatory duties may be pursued as a
private cause of action.35
Although there are no reported decisions in Louisiana concerning
alleged violations of the check stub statute, there has been significant
litigation in other states.36 Plaintiffs in these suits typically contend that the
lessee has not complied with the relevant statute in that the information
provided on the check stub is either erroneous or fraudulent.
One significant case is a class action brought against an array of producers
and pipeline companies in Oklahoma. A jury verdict in the amount of
seventy-four million dollars was awarded based upon the jury’s
determination that the producer did not disclose the deductions of certain
transportation charges on the check stub. In an unpublished opinion, the
appellate court held that an award of almost nineteen million dollars in
punitive damages for fraud was appropriate because the check stub
misrepresented that no fees had been deducted.37
In another noteworthy case arising out of Oklahoma, the plaintiff’s
averment that the lessee was liable for constructive fraud, because it did not
properly report to the lessor the amount of deductions assessed against the
royalty, was denied.38
2. Sophisticated Lease39
A “sophisticated lessor” is a hypothetical lessor who owns significant
land or mineral holdings to the end that it has the commercial standing to
demand or insist upon terms, provisions, and considerations that are
generally more favorable than a lessor who owns the executive interest in
smaller tracts of land (or interests therein), such that the latter does not enjoy
the “bargaining power” of the “sophisticated lessor.” In Louisiana, there are
land-holding companies that own many, many thousands of acres and have
35. For example, in Anderson v. Ochsner Health System, 172 So. 3d 579, 586
(La. 2014), the Louisiana Supreme Court examined the Health Care and
Consumer Billing and Disclosure Protection Act, and found that “an implied
private right of action exists under La. R.S. 22:1871, et seq. based on (1) the
legislature’s failure to expressly prohibit an individual remedy; (2) the legislative
intent to protect consumers; and (3) the constitutional right of access to the courts
in order to seek personal relief.”
36. See Mark D. Christiansen, The Confused State of Oil and Gas Royalty
Check Stub Law, 17 TEX. OIL & GAS L.J. 13 (2003).
37. Bridenstine v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co., No. CJ-2000-1 (Tex. County Dist.
Ct., Okla., Nov. 9, 2001), aff’d No. 97,117 (Okla. Civ. App., Aug. 22, 2003).
38. Roberts Ranch Co. v. Exxon Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (W.D. Okla. 1997).
39. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 1-13.
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the ability to employ or engage a technical staff of geologists, land
managers, engineers, and the like. Quite frequently, such a “sophisticated
lessor” has the ability to assume a “take it or leave it” position with regard
to lease terms.
For these and other reasons, the “sophisticated lessor” generally has
its own specially prepared lease form and would not typically agree to use
one of the prevalent commercially printed lease forms, at least not without
significant modifications, additions, or alterations by way of an addendum
or exhibit added to such form.
It is not uncommon to find a specially-crafted clause in a mineral lease
from a “sophisticated lessor” that either requires the lessee to furnish
specified information relative to production and other activities, or to
permit the lessor, upon notice, to review the books and records of the
lessee relative to such matters.40
3. Online Data
Another source of information for the lessor is the Strategic Online
Natural Resources Information System (SONRIS), maintained by the
Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, Office of Conservation.41 It
contains a significant amount of relevant data as reported by an operator.
An array of rules or regulations, including Statewide Orders, require that the
operator report a variety of information, including information pertaining to
the conduct of operations, unitization, and volumes of production, all on a
well or unit basis.42 Obviously, the data on SONRIS is only as current as
relevant information that is reported by an operator from time to time. This
information, as reported on SONRIS, should be reliable as it is a criminal
offense to “[m]ake or cause to be made any false entry or statement of fact
in any report required to be made by this Chapter or by any rule, regulation,
or order made hereunder.”43
The relevant regulations do not, however, require that values or prices
for oil or gas be filed with the Department of Natural Resources. Hence,
40. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 5-23.
41. SONRIS is easily accessible through the website of the Office of
Conservation.
42. The information filed with the Office of Conservation is a “public
record.” See Taylor v. Smith, 619 So. 2d 881, 884 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (“Insofar
as the Office of Conservation is the ‘public record’ as to who is the operator of
record, third parties are entitled to rely upon this ‘public record’ in actions against
an operator, without examining the entire well file in an attempt to determine the
responsible party.”).
43. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:17(1) (2017).
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the interested lessor can only ascertain volumes as reported, not monetary
pricing.
As noted above, article 212.31 of the Louisiana Mineral Code requires
that the check stub reflect, among other information, the “[t]otal barrels of
crude oil or MCF of gas purchased.”44
4. Direct Requests to the Lessee
Unless a special clause contained in the mineral lease obligates the
lessee to provide information desired by the lessor, the lessee is not
required to share information beyond that which the lessee is mandated to
disclose on the check stub. Nevertheless, the lessee would be well-advised
to try to accommodate reasonable requests by the lessor, even if there is
no enforceable mechanism to require it to do so. Good will between the
lessor and lessee might pay significant dividends when and if a real
controversy arises.
Arguable bases for the provision of this information might be found
in the requirement of article 122 of the Mineral Code that the lessee must
“perform the contract in good faith and . . . develop and operate the
property leased as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of
himself and his lessor.”45 However, there are no cases in which a court has
found that a duty to provide information is encompassed in this article.46
E. Determining the Products to Which Royalty is Applied Pursuant to the
“Royalty Clause”
Typically, the “Royalty Clause” of a mineral lease certainly covers oil
and gas, as well as “other minerals.”47 The principle of “freedom of
contract” permits contracting parties to specify the minerals to which the
mineral lease pertains. This might be accomplished by including a

44. Id. at § 31:212.31. The measurement of natural gas is examined in Part
II.B hereof.
45. Id. at § 31:122.
46. Cf. McCarthy v. Evolution Petroleum Corp., 180 So. 3d 252, 260 (La.
2015) (“From the language just quoted from Article 122, it appears that parties to
mineral leases may contractually impose a duty for a lessee to disclose
information, . . . The petition here, however, is devoid of an allegation that the
parties had contractually imposed such disclosure by the lessees.”). In the interest
of full disclosure, your author filed a brief on behalf of certain amici curiae in
support of a writ application by the defendant, and on the merits in this case.
47. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 1-10.
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“Covered Minerals Clause,” although one does not usually encounter such
a provision except in a “sophisticated lease.”48
The Commissioner of Conservation classifies a well as either an oil or
gas well. This classification is determined by the “gas/oil ratio.”49 “Oil” is
defined, for purposes of the Conservation Act, as “crude petroleum oil, and
other hydrocarbons, regardless of gravity, which are produced at the well head
in liquid form by ordinary production methods.”50 The same statute defines
“gas” as “all natural gas, including casinghead gas, and all other hydrocarbons
not defined as oil in Paragraph (7) of this Section.”51
Although these definitions are contained in Section 3 of the Conservation
Act,52 the definitions also comport with the traditional and usual
understanding of the terms in other contexts. Certainly, they are not defined
in the Louisiana Mineral Code.
It can be a bit more complicated than that. A well might encounter
different types of gas. In that event, questions exist as to whether that
product is to be treated as oil or gas for purposes of the “Royalty Clause” of
the mineral lease.
In the nascent stages of the industry, a new product referred to as
“casinghead gas” (produced usually from oil wells) gave rise to considerable
litigation and may continue to present uncertainty where the “Royalty Clause”
of the mineral lease is not carefully drafted. Casinghead gas is nothing but wet
gas.
For example, in Wemple v. Producers’ Oil Co.,53 the lessor sought an
accounting for royalty on casinghead gas produced by the lessee. Judgment
was rendered for the plaintiff, and pursuant to a writ application filed by the
defendant, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed.
In the “Royalty Clause” of the pertinent mineral lease, it was specified
that the royalty was to be based on one-eighth (1/8) of all oil produced and
saved, and $200.00 per year for each gas well.

48. See id. at § 5-27.
49. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 3501, et seq (2017).
50. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:3(7) (2013).
51. Id. at § 30:3(3).
52. The listing of definitions in Section 3 of the Conservation Act is prefaced
with the admonition that, “[u]nless the context otherwise requires, the words
defined in this Section have the following meaning when found in this Chapter.”
Hence, by force of law, these definitions are not necessarily controlling in other
statutes, including the Mineral Code.
53. 83 So. 232 (La. 1919).
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The lessee contended that it had the right, under the mineral lease, to
produce the casinghead gas; nonetheless, since casinghead gas is neither
oil nor gas, no royalties were due to lessor thereon.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that casinghead gas, being a
product saved from the production of the oil, is a part of the oil. The
casinghead gas is a lighter constituent of the liquid product that would be
produced as one product by another production method. Therefore, the
Court held, it is subject to the same royalty provisions as oil. The mere fact
that the lessee operated under a vacuum-pumping method, and thereby
produced casinghead gas, is not sufficient to allow him the right and benefit
of that casinghead gas free of his obligation to pay royalty on oil, which
would be produced if the lessee had utilized another pumping method. The
Court obviously viewed the lessee’s contention as “form over substance.”
Thus, the Court held that the lessor was entitled to one-eighth (1/8) of
the gasoline extracted from the casinghead gas from an oil well because it
was clear that the gasoline was part of the heavier oil that was being produced.
In another case,54 a lessor sued its lessee contending that the latter had
failed to properly pay royalties on a produced constituent. The respective
position of the parties was set forth as follows:
The plaintiff contends that a certain colorless fluid produced by
the gas wells through separators is a high grade crude oil resulting
from the normal operation of the gas wells and, therefore, comes
within the oil royalty clause of the lease and not the gas royalty
provision thereof.
The lessee contends that the colorless fluid produced by the gas
wells through the means of separators is gasoline within the
meaning of the provisions of the lease covering the payment of
royalty on the gas produced from the wells and that as all of this
royalty has been paid, the plaintiff’s additional claims for royalty
are without merit.55
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court
in favor of the lessee, holding that “the distillate produced by these gas
wells was to be paid for by the lessee under the gas royalty clause of the
lease and not under the oil royalty clause thereof.”56

54. Roy v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 7 So. 2d 895 (La. 1942).
55. Id. at 895.
56. Id. at 903.
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Once the character of the actual product being obtained from the well
is determined, it is necessary to ascertain whether the lessor is entitled to
all, or only part, of the royalty pertaining thereto.
F. Determining and Expressing the Royalty Interest
Whether the mathematics involved in determining the lessor’s gross
royalty payment is simple or complicated is partially dependent on the
quality of the lessor’s title; that is, whether it is a whole or fractional
interest, and if the lessor’s interest is subject to any burdens on production.
“Burden” means that the mineral interest of a lessor might be subject to a
real charge in the form of a mineral royalty interest.57 In such a case, distinct
calculations need to be made, lessor-by-lessor, or interest-by-interest, and
this might be a more complicated or detailed calculation.
When there are multiple co-owners in a tract of land, all of whom have
executed a mineral lease or leases providing for the same reserved royalty,
all of the discrete royalty interests should add up precisely to the reserved
royalty interest. However, the arithmetic can get more complicated if burdens
exist that must be taken into consideration, particularly if the burdens do not
uniformly or proportionally apply across the burdened mineral interest of the
lessors.
While not mandated by any tenet of law, the industry customarily
expresses revenue numbers in seven decimal places, with appropriate
rounding to ensure that the formula achieves the correct arithmetical sum
of all interests.
G. Determining from Whence Production is Obtained
1. Preface
The lessee cannot take the necessary steps to quantify or value the
production on which the lessor’s royalty is to be calculated unless it knows
precisely from whence that production was obtained. This important

57. “His share of the minerals when they are produced is royalty. At the
moment of the execution of the royalty sale, under our holding in Vincent et al. v.
Bullock et al., [187 So. 35 (La. 1939)], a species of real right is created, imposing
a burden upon the land, which is subject to the prescription of 10 years liberandi
causa.” Continental Oil Co. v. Landry, 41 So. 2d 73, 75 (La. 1949) (emphasis
added).
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threshold inquiry necessarily presents both a “vertical” and “horizontal”
consideration or feature.58
For these purposes, the “vertical” consideration has reference to the
“land,” or “tract of land,” on which the well giving rise to the production
is located. This aspect is characterized as “vertical” in the illustrative sense
of a cookie cutter piercing the surface of the earth, creating a perimeter of
the “tract of land” involved.59 This “vertical” consideration is examined in
Part I.G.2 hereof.
Before turning to the “horizontal” feature, it must first be noted that a
well is completed for production by creating or shooting “perforations” in
the casing that constitutes the borehole.60 A “perforation” is essentially a
hole punched into the casing created by a perforating gun that penetrates
the production casing, its associated cement sheath, and the rock formation
some distance into the reservoir, to allow the associated reservoir to be
drained through the pressure differential thus created between the interior
of the casing and the pressurized reservoir.
Hence, the “horizontal” component addresses the issue of the precise
or actual subsurface depth of the perforations that allow oil or gas to enter
58. It is your author’s experience that there is not a universally accepted
understanding of the difference between a “vertical” limitation and a “horizontal”
limitation–whether it be in the context of a royalty burden, “Pugh Clause,” or “depth
limitation clause.” On more than one occasion, your author has encountered a
discussion wherein one party alludes to a “vertical” limitation or restriction, or has
stated that a mineral lease has expired “vertically,” only to be asked, “Don’t you
mean ‘horizontally?’” The confusion or misunderstanding resides in the fact that
“vertical” means, and in a visual sense runs, “north to south,” while horizontal
means, and visually runs, “east to west.” Nevertheless, in the jargon of the industry,
while “horizontal” might allude to a specific stratum under the earth, is not such
stratum reached “vertically” from the surface of the earth to the subsurface point of
production? And conversely, the term “vertical”–such as in a “vertical” “Pugh
Clause” [the obvious opposite of a “horizontal” “Pugh Clause” of the type involved
in Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Duhon, 961 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1992)]–conjures the
notion that the exterior perimeters of a unit are, in a sense, extended into the earth,
vertically, “from the surface to China.” Yet to some, that seems to deal with the
“horizontal” because it is running “north to south,” into the earth’s subsurface. The
foregoing is an adaptation of footnote 175 of Chapter Ten of OTTINGER, MINERAL
LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1.
59. If the well is a “true vertical well,” it is easy. However, if there is more
than a five (5°) degree deviation from true vertical, it is the bottom hole location
that controls. See infra note 77.
60. The “borehole” is the “hole made by drilling or boring a hole.” PATRICK
H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS: MANUAL OF OIL AND
GAS TERMS 8 (16th ed. 2015).

2017]

CALCULATING THE LESSOR’S ROYALTY PAYMENT

17

the borehole of the well, and then to travel to the surface from the reservoir
to which the perforations correlate, at which point the “[m]inerals are
reduced to possession [in that] they are under physical control that permits
delivery to another.”61 This “horizontal” consideration is taken up in Part
I.G.3 hereof.
2. The “Vertical” Consideration: Determining the Land from Which
Production is Obtained
It requires no great elaboration to understand that it is necessary to
discern the geographical location of the source of production to be
subjected to the formula for the calculation of the royalty payment. This
necessitates an understanding of the relevant tract of land and whether the
tract of land is subject to burdens or community leases.
a. Understanding “Tracts of Land”
It is essential to understand the meaning and importance of the terms
“land” and “tract of land” as they pertain to the disbursement of proceeds
from a well situated “on” the land. In other words, for purposes of
determining the entitlement of a lessor to a royalty payment on production
from a well, what is the relevance of the fact that a producing well is
situated “on” a certain tract of land? What role does that geographical fact
(the precise location of the well “on” the “tract of land”) play in the
ascertainment of the parties entitled to share in production?
Louisiana Civil Code article 462 provides that “[t]racts of land . . . are
immovables.”62 Comment (c) to article 462 announces that “[l]ands may
be defined as portions of the surface of the earth.”63
Louisiana law establishes, “[u]nless otherwise provided by law, the
ownership of a tract of land carries with it the ownership of everything that
is directly above or under it.”64 Hence, the “owner may make works on,
above, or below the land as he pleases, and draw all the advantages that
accrue from them, unless he is restrained by law or by rights of others.”65
The Louisiana Mineral Code employs the term “land” in each of the
articles that define the three basic mineral rights.66 Importantly, the
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:7 (1975).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 462 (2017).
Id. cmt. (c).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 490 (2017).
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:21, 31:80, 31:114 (1975).
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definition of “‘royalty,’ as used in connection with mineral leases,” alludes
to an “interest in production, or its value, from or attributable to land subject
to a mineral lease.”67
In Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v. Parish of Jefferson, Louisiana,68
the court stated:
The term ‘land’ has a definite meaning in the law as well as in the
popular mind—a meaning as settled and firm as the thing that it
represents. ‘Land,’ to lawyer and layman alike, means the soil, the
solum, terra firma, a section of Mother Earth. No argument, however
ingenious, can budge this stubborn fact.69
More contemporary judicial recognition of the meaning of “land” is
provided in Alyce Gaines Johnson Special Trust v. El Paso E & P Co.,
Ltd.,70 where, in reference to the coverage of a mineral lease, the court
stated, as follows:
Land in Louisiana has a specific and defined meaning. According
to La. Civ. C. art. 462 cmt. (c), “[l]and may be defined as portions
of the surface of the earth.” “Unless otherwise provided by law,
the ownership of a tract of land carries with it the ownership of
everything that is directly above or under it.” La. Civ. C. art 490.
As the Louisiana Civil Code makes clear Louisiana property law
embraces the colorful Latin maxim of cujus est solum ejus est
usque ad coelum et ad inferos (“for whoever owns the soil, it is
theirs up to Heaven and down to Hell”).71
One tract of land is separated from another different tract of land by a
“boundary,” a term defined in article 784 of the Louisiana Civil Code: “A
boundary is the line of separation between contiguous lands. A boundary
marker is a natural or artificial object that marks on the ground the line of
separation of contiguous lands.”72
A tract of land is said to be “contiguous” to another tract of land when
it is so situated that one might pass from one part to the other without the

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at § 31:213(5) (emphasis added).
59 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. La. 1945).
Id. at 265.
773 F. Supp. 2d 640 (W.D. La.), aff’d 438 F. App’x 340 (5th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 645.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 784 (2017).
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necessity of crossing the property of another party.73 Thus, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has held that, where two tracts met only at a common
survey point (i.e., two corners touch), the tracts were not contiguous
because no one could pass through a mere point.74
A “boundary” also might, in non-statutory vernacular, be called a
“property line.” In the view of the Louisiana Office of Conservation, for a
variety of conservation purposes,75 it is important to understand the
“property line” between two tracts of land. In relevant rules, the term
“property line” means “the boundary dividing tracts on which mineral rights,
royalty, or leases are separately owned, except that where conventional units
shall have been created for the drilling of the well, the boundaries of the unit
shall be considered the property line.”76
The rules of the Office of Conservation relative to the preparation of a
unit survey plat provide, among other requirements of content,
[t]he affected tracts [of land] shall be identified on the survey plat
by the names of the fee and lease owners, based on the best
available information. Further, each unit plat shall have an inset
or attachment showing the number, name, acreage (or other basis
of participation) and the unit percentage participation of each tract
[of land].77
Thus, the necessity to fix and reflect a “property line” or “boundary”
between two tracts of land (even with common, identical ownership of the
surface of the land) arises when there is a change in the ownership of
leasehold, minerals or royalties, not merely or exclusively if there is a
change in the ownership of the land (surface) itself.
From these foundational observations, one concludes that the location
of a well is to be considered “on” the “tract of land” which it is actually
73. Baham v. Vernon, 42 So. 2d 141, 145 (La. 1949) (“‘[C]ontiguous tracts
of land’ must be tracts or bodies of land which have one side, or at least part of
one side, in common.”). See also Turner v. Glass, 195 So. 645, 646 (La. 1940)
(“Two tracts of land which touch only at a common corner are not contiguous.”).
74. “And to constitute a single tract of land the lands must be so situated that
one may pass from one part to the other without passing over the lands of another.
But, as it is impossible to pass through a mere point, it follows that one cannot
pass from said section 31 to section 1 without passing over other lands.” Lee v.
Giauque, 97 So. 669, 670 (La. 1923).
75. Not the least of which is the notion of “well spacing.” See LA. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 1901, et seq (2017).
76. Id. at § 1903A.
77. Id. at § 4103A2.
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situated, to the full geographic extent or areal reach of that drill site tract,
as far as it goes, until a “property line” is reached, delineating another,
adjacent tract under which the mineral, royalty or leasehold “mix” differs
from the parent drill site tract. In this regard, the “boundary” of a “tract of
land” may be indicative of a change in the ownership of the soil, of
minerals, of leasehold, or of royalties under the next adjacent tract of land.
As next demonstrated, the need to delineate a “boundary” and thereby
define the surface extent of a “tract of land,” is absolutely critical in order
for the lessee to make a proper allocation of a well’s production to a
distinct “tract.”
In the absence of unitization, production from a “lease basis” well78 is
payable to the mineral or royalty owners of the distinct tract of land under
which the bottom hole of the well is situated,79 notwithstanding that the
pertinent mineral lease covers other lands, conceivably with a different mix
of royalty burdens. This observation presents itself in two distinct situations.
b. Mineral Royalty Burdening Distinct Portions of the Leased
Premises
Consideration is given, in Part II.D.2 hereof, to the need to identify
any burden that constitutes a real charge on the lessor’s interest in minerals
in a tract of land, thus resulting in a diminution of the royalty payment to
which that lessor is entitled.80

78. Tellingly, the rules of the Office of Conservation relative to well
nomenclature allude to a non-unitized well as a “lease basis” well. LA. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 103E2 (2017) (“All wells drilled on a lease basis shall
bear the lessor’s surname and initials or given name.”). Indeed, it has been held
that, “[i]n the absence of forced or voluntary pooling or unitization, the leased
property is considered as the producing unit.” Sun Exploration and Prod. Co. v.
Rogers, 451 So. 2d 587, 591 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
79. The well might be a “true vertical well,” in which both the well’s surface
location and bottom hole location (BHL) are on or under the same tract of land
(without a deviation of more than 5° from the vertical (see LA. ADMIN. CODE tit.
43, pt. XIX, § 135A (2017))), or it might be a well that is directionally drilled
from a surface location on one tract, but the bottom hole location is under a
different tract of land. See Helmer Directional Drilling, Inc. v. Dexco, Inc., 653
So. 3d 1245, 1247, n.4 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (“There are three components to a
drilling objective: (1) depth; (2) displacement; and (3) direction.”). Regardless, it
is the BHL that determines the tract of land entitled to share in production on a
“lease basis.”
80. Where it exists, a mineral royalty merely represents a reallocation of some
portion of the royalty payment otherwise due in its entirety to a lessor. In totality,
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Historically, the word “royalty” arose from the European feudal systems
in which the sovereign owned all minerals. The right to exploit mines and
quarries was granted by the Crown, in which case, a “royalty” share, free of
expenses, was reserved.
One commentator explained the origin of the term “royalty” as follows:
The term “royalty” comes down to us through the channels of the
old common law of England and its derivation is interesting. Under
the theory of land tenure under the feudal system in force and effect
in England during the early middle ages, the title to the manor and
“royal mines” of gold and silver was vested in the crown by royal
prerogative and, being subject to alienation at his pleasure, was held
in fief by the tenants who worked the mines and cultivated the lands
under the feudal lords. The tenant held only a “working interest” so
to speak, and produced the crops at his own labor and expense,
while the landlords or royal fee owners, holding title direct from the
crown, reserved their share of the product of the soil, which share
was termed a “royalty” or that portion belonging to the landlords
under royal grant or favor.81
In its most general sense, a royalty (whatever its kind) is a passive
right in that the holder must rely on the actions (and capital) of others to
generate any corpus of money to which the royalty will relate.
If a mineral royalty exists, it only encumbers the distinct tract of land
that it burdens. If that seems like an obvious truism, consider the contentions
made in Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Carter.82
A mineral lease was granted on the west half of a governmental section
of land.83 After the lease was granted, the lessors sold mineral royalty interests
to certain parties as to the southwest quarter of the section and conveyed other
or different royalty interests to other parties as to the northwest quarter of the
section. The case was a concursus proceeding brought to determine
entitlement to production from a well drilled in the southwest quarter of
the section, burdened by one, but not both, of the mineral royalty interests.

the revenue owed to the lessor and all mineral royalty owners should equal the
royalty due under the mineral lease.
81. SAMUEL H. GLASSMIRE, LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES AND ROYALTIES §
17 (2d. ed. 1938).
82. 175 So. 1 (La. 1937).
83. Louisiana employs a grid system whereby governmental sections are
delineated on surveys established or maintained by the Register of the State Land
Office. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 50:121 (2017).

22

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. VI

The owners of the royalty interest in the northwest quarter (where no
well was drilled) contended that they were entitled to participate in
production from the well drilled in the southwest quarter of the section, in
reliance upon the “Entirety Clause” of the mineral lease.84
The Court rejected this contention, saying, as follows:
The sale of the undivided interests in the royalty in this case
amounts to nothing more or less than the limitation of the royalty to
the N. 1/2 or to the S. 1/2 of the tract, to be participated in by the
individuals purchasing the royalty to be produced from that
particular tract.85
While the conclusion of the Court is certainly logical, it is also consistent
with the “rule of capture” that prevails in Louisiana.86
c. “Community Leases”87
A “community lease” is a mineral lease that is executed by multiple
lessors who own separate and distinct tracts of land that are described in,
and, thus, covered and affected by, such lease as an aggregated tract of land.
In the consistent view of the courts, operations on or production from
any tract of land described in a “community lease” will maintain leasehold
rights in force and effect as to the entirety of the leased premises described
therein. Most disputes involving “community leases” are concerned with the
issue of entitlement to royalties produced from a well situated on one of the
tracts included in a “community lease.”
In United Gas Public Service Co. v. Eaton,88 three distinct owners
granted a mineral lease describing their separate tracts of land as one
aggregated tract. The lessee drilled a well on one portion of the tract, and
84. Paragraph 11 of the mineral lease was held inapplicable because the
“[a]ppellants are not the vendees of the owners of separate tracts pooled in a joint
lease. It is not possible, therefore, to divide the royalty in this case in proportion
to the ownership of the acreage.” 175 So. at 4. See also OTTINGER, MINERAL
LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-31 (concerning the “Entirety Clause”).
85. 175 So. at 3.
86. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:6, 31:8, 31:14 (1975). See also Pierce v.
GoldKing Prop., Inc., 396 So. 2d 528, 533-34 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied 400 So.
2d 904 (La. 1981) (“Under Louisiana’s so-called ‘rule of capture’ a landowner is
not the owner of minerals beneath the surface of his lands, but rather has only the
right to search for and draw minerals through the soil and thereby become the
owner thereof.”).
87. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 6-03.
88. 153 So. 702 (La. Ct. App. 1934).
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filed a concursus to determine ownership of royalties from that well. The
court held that royalties were not to be pooled, but were solely payable to
the owner of the tract on which the well was situated.
The court explained its rationale, as follows:
The question raised by the alternative contention of Emmons and
his assignees is of first impression in this state. They contend that
the lease is joint as to the lessors and not severable on the basis of
their ownership of the minerals when the lease was executed. The
question has been before many of the courts of other oil producing
states of the Union. There are two distinct lines of jurisprudence
on the subject. The majority rule does not support the contention
that from the fact of owners of different tracts, or owners of
different interests in parcels of the same tract, joining in the same
lease, a presumption arises that they intend thereby to pool their
various properties or interests and tacitly agree to have the land
operated as an entirety and to share in production from one or all
of the tracts covered by the lease, on the basis of proportionate
ownership. To the contrary, if any presumption arises at all it
certainly would be in favor of the negative of such a proposition.
Intention to pool interests in this matter may only be determined
from the express contract of the parties or from facts and
circumstances which certainly establish such intention on their
part. It should never be inferred simply from the fact that different
owners joined in the same lease contract.89
In French v. Querbes,90 plaintiffs, husband and wife, sued to recover
royalties allegedly due to them under a mineral lease. The lease covered
two tracts of land—one being a 52-acre tract owned solely by the wife as
her separate property, and the second being a 40-acre tract owned in
community. The wife later sold one-half (1/2) of the minerals under the
40-acre tract to Williams, which deed was later ratified by the husband
insofar as it affected community property.91
The lessee obtained production on or attributable to the 40-acre tract,
and royalties were paid equally to the plaintiffs and defendants.
Plaintiffs asserted that they were entitled to 72/92 of the lease
royalties,92 rather than one-half (1/2) (or 46/92) of the royalties thereunder.
89. Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
90. 8 So. 2d 631 (La. 1942).
91. Id. at 633.
92. Plaintiffs urged that the royalty from the well situated on the 40-acre tract
in which they owned one-half (1/2) of the minerals should be disbursed pursuant
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The plaintiffs contended that the mineral lease was a “community lease”
and therefore royalties should be apportioned on the basis of each mineral
owner’s interest, on a weighted average basis, and under all tracts of land
described in the lease.
The defendants resisted the demand, positing that the lease was not a
“community lease” because it disclosed no intention of the parties to pool
or communitize their interests under each and every distinct tract of land.
The Court did not embrace the plaintiffs’ contention, stating, as
follows:
The jurisprudence of this State is well-settled, when two or more
tracts of land separately owned are included in one lease, that that
fact alone does not create the presumption that the lessors intended
to pool their royalties or make a joint or community lease. Martel
v. A. Veeder Co., 199 La. 423, 6 So.2d 335.93
Citing Louisiana Canal Co., Inc. v. Heyd, the Court stated:
In all cases where parties owning separate tracts of land execute
together one oil and gas lease covering their separate tracts and
where the lease contract contains no community or pooling clause,
whether they are entitled to share proportionately in the royalties,
regardless of which tract is developed, depends on the intention of
the parties. From the fact that the parties join in the same lease
contract and from that fact alone, there does not necessarily arise
a presumption that they intended to pool.94
The Court in French further explained the relevant principles, as
follows:
The majority rule is that such a lease is severable as between the
lessors and each lessor only shares in production from his own
land. The majority rule does not support the contention that from
the fact of owners of different tracts, or owners of different
interests in parcels of the same tract, joining in the same lease, a
presumption arises that they intended thereby to pool their various
properties or interests and tacitly agree to have the land operated
to this formula: 20/40 + 52/52 = 72/92. The court rejected plaintiffs’ contention,
and held that production should be split on the basis of ownership under the drill
site tract “50-50.”
93. 8 So. 2d at 633.
94. Id. (citing 181 So. 439 (La. 1938)).
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as an entirety and to share in production from one or all of the
tracts covered by the lease, on the basis of proportionate ownership.
To the contrary, if any presumption arises at all it certainly would
be in favor of the negative of such a proposition. Intention to pool
interests in this matter may only be determined from the express
contract of the parties or from facts and circumstances which
certainly establish such intention on their part. It should never be
inferred simply from the fact that different owners joined in the
same lease contract. . . . For us to say that they did intend to pool
their interests would be writing into the contract a very material
provision which the parties themselves did not think well enough
of to incorporate therein . . . .95
The plaintiffs also advanced an argument based on the usual
“Proportionate Reduction Clause” contained in printed mineral lease forms.
That clause provides that, “if said lessor owns a less interest” than “the entire
and undivided fee simple estate therein,” royalties and rentals may be
reduced in proportion to the interest of the party to whom paid. The plaintiffs
contended that such clause evinced an intention “to make a community or
joint lease covering both tracts of land.”96
The Court rejected this proposition, noting that such a “clause is inserted
in the lease to protect the lessee against the hazard of having to pay more
than the total royalty stipulated in the lease, in the event it should develop
that the lessors were not the sole owners of the mineral estate.”97
The Court explained its rejection of this contention, as follows:
If the Court were to hold that this provision is sufficient to show
the intention on the part of the lessors to pool or unitize their
royalties, then practically every oil and gas lease in existence in
this State confected on the identical ordinary printed forms would
be joint or pooling leases, where they covered two or more tracts
of land owned by different parties. Certainly, no one contemplated
such a result. When lessors intend to pool or unitize their royalties
they insert in the lease a statement to the effect that the royalties
shall be paid according to the proportion in which the lessors own

95. Id. at 633-34 (internal citations omitted).
96. Id. at 634.
97. Id. See also OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 430 (concerning the “Proportionate Reduction Clause”).
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the minerals in the entire leased premises and without regard to
the location of the well or wells subsequently drilled . . . .98
Thus, while a “Proportionate Reduction Clause” is important in a
mineral lease, its inclusion does not itself operate to make the lease a
“community lease.”
3. The “Horizontal” Consideration: Determining the Subsurface
Depth from Which Production is Obtained
The “horizontal” feature of production is an important factor if there
are different interests in rights to minerals at different subsurface levels
underlying the surface of the earth.
In this regard, the “horizontal” aspect has reference to a volumetric
body of production, not a flat, one-dimensional line. For example, in
Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Duhon,99 the court rejected a party’s contention
“that the word ‘horizon’ means a flat, parallel boundary line which would
be drawn” at a certain subsurface depth and held that the district court
properly determined “that the parties intended it to mean ‘a body of
material or a stratum found below the earth’s surface, generally considered
to be a bed of sand or other material which contains oil, gas, and other
minerals . . . .’”100
While it is true that “the ownership of a tract of land carries with it the
ownership of everything that is directly above or under it,”101 it is also
possible that the lessor (or its predecessor) created interests or burdens that
vary by subsurface zones or depths. This circumstance can be presented in
a variety of ways.
For example, a “single mineral servitude is established on a continuous
tract of land notwithstanding that certain horizons or levels are excluded or
the right to share in production varies as to different portions of the tract or
different levels or horizons.”102
In like manner, a mineral royalty may be established with respect to
distinct subsurface zones or depths, leaving any unburdened strata free of
the mineral royalty.103

98. 8 So. 2d at 634.
99. 961 F.2d 1207.
100. Id. at 1211.
101. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 490 (2017).
102. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:68 (1975).
103. Id., as made applicable to mineral royalties by LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
31:101 (1975).
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Certainly, an executive owner may grant a mineral lease as to distinct
subsurface depths, leaving other depths unleased. Those “other depths”
may later be leased with a different royalty reserved by the lessor.
An illustration will demonstrate why it is imperative for the lessee to
discern the precise subsurface point from which production is being
obtained. Consider a mineral lease granted as to a “tract of land,” but limited
to subsurface depths from the surface of the earth to 8,000 feet. Subsurface
depths deeper than 8,000 feet below the surface of the earth are not leased,
so this “shallow lease” provides for a twenty percent lessor’s royalty.104
Thereafter, a mineral lease is granted as to subsurface depths below
and deeper than 10,000 feet below the surface of the earth. This “deep
lease” sets forth a twenty-five percent lessor’s royalty as reserved by the
lessor. Hence, in this example, subsurface depths below or deeper than
8,000 feet below the surface of the earth, but shallower than 10,000 feet
below the surface of the earth, are not leased.
When the Commissioner of Conservation issues an order creating and
establishing a compulsory unit,105 the Commissioner’s order invariably has
a “sand definition,” articulating a “defined interval.”106 The order is depthspecific in that the “sand definition” will set forth a geological description
or identification of the pool being unitized.107 Accordingly, a well drilled
within the exterior perimeter of a compulsory unit, although thereby
satisfying the “vertical” feature, would not be deemed to constitute a unit
well unless it is also completed (by way of perforations) for production from
the defined sand interval (thus satisfying the “horizontal” consideration).
A well completed and producing from the first lease (the “shallow
lease”) would involve a twenty percent royalty, while a well completed
and producing from the second lease (the “deep lease”) would impose a
twenty-five percent royalty. A well completed on another tract in a unit
for the intervening depths, say, at 9,000 feet, would not involve the
104. For an explanation of “shallow rights” and “deep rights,” see footnote
143 of Chapter Five of OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1.
105. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213(6) (1983).
106. The Commissioner’s rules require that the pre-application notice and
application for a public hearing contain a “definition of the sand proposed for
unitization with such sand defined in each reservoir thereof by reference to well
log measurements.” See Rules of Procedure for Conducting Hearings Before the
Commissioner of Conservation of the State of Louisiana effective October 11,
1983. See also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 3901, et seq (2017).
107. “‘Pool’ means an underground reservoir containing a common
accumulation of crude petroleum or gas or both. Each zone of a general structure
that is completely separated from any other zone in the structure is covered by the
term ‘pool.’” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213(3) (2017). See also id. at § 30:3(10).
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calculation of royalties with respect to such land since that interval is
unleased. This unique circumstance would involve significant issues
discussed elsewhere.108
II. THE FACTORS AND CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED
IN THE CALCULATION OF THE GROSS ROYALTY PAYMENT
A. Preface
In Part I, consideration was given to assembling the array of elements
or component parts that are essential to the implementation of a basic
formula for the calculation of a lessor’s royalty payment.
While there is probably only one way to correctly calculate the precise
gross royalty owed to the lessor, there are a variety of ways to get it wrong.
Purely by way of example, errors in the calculation of a gross royalty
interest could arise from improper pricing for the produced oil or gas;
incorrect volumes or quantities of product; uncertainty as to the status or
existence of apparent burdens; or erroneous title determinations, to name
only a few.
B. Quantity of Product in Measured Units
The volume of production to which our formula is to be applied is the
aggregated block of production represented by the full revenue stream of the
well, if it is produced on a “lease basis.” However, if the well is unitized, the
stream is to be both diminished and allocated on a tract basis, as discussed
below.109
Self-evidently, the lessee’s production of oil or gas generates the
relevant commodity in volumetric terms. Certainly, no proper calculation of
a lessor’s royalty payment can proceed without first recognizing and
measuring the captured product.
In a severance tax dispute, the Louisiana Supreme Court observed that
the measuring or metering of oil or gas is integral to the industry, stating
“[t]he plaintiff has the right under its leases not only to explore for and
produce gas but also to market the gas so produced, since otherwise the right
to explore for and produce would be valueless, and that in marketing the
gas the producer must necessarily measure it . . . .”110
108. See Patrick S. Ottinger, After the Lessee Walks Away–The Rights and
Obligations of the Unleased Mineral Owner in a Producing Unit, 55 ANN. INST.
ON MIN. L. 59 (2008).
109. See infra Parts IV.B, IV.C.
110. Bel Oil Corp. v. Fontenot, 117 So. 2d 571, 573 (La. 1959).
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Oil and gas are marketed on a volumetric basis, calibrated in units. Oil
is measured in barrels; a barrel of oil contains forty-two gallons.111 In
contrast, gas is measured in thousand cubic feet (Mcf), but, as will be
noted, is typically marketed based upon its energy value, expressed in
Million British Thermal Units (MMBtus).112
Check stubs have been found to report the gross price for gas
expressed in MMBtus, rather than (as explicitly required by article 138.1)
thousand cubic feet (Mcf), and at other times, check stubs have reflected
some stated factor permitting conversion from MMBtu to Mcf. To be sure,
caution should be taken in examining the quantity of gas production
reported on SONRIS with that reflected in the check stub that accompanies
the royalty check. An “apples to oranges” situation will arise when the
information reported on SONRIS reflects volumes of gas in terms of Mcf,
while the check stub might reflect market value pricing (usually tethered
to a future price at New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX),113 or some
other benchmark), based upon a MMBtu.114
Gas units are converted from Mcf to MMBtu based upon an analysis
of the gas as to its heating value, which is unique for each different source
of gas. A very generalized “rule of thumb” formula to convert “an
average” price of gas per Mcf to “an average” price per MMBtu can be
achieved by dividing the former by 1.032. Conversely, to convert the price
per MMBtu of gas to the price per Mcf, multiply the former by 1.032.115
Caveat emptor!

111. For an interesting history of the evolution of the 42-gallon barrel of oil
(including, believe it or not, its connection to the Heisman Trophy), see History
of the 42-Gallon Oil Barrel, AMERICAN OIL & GAS HISTORICAL SOCIETY,
https://perma.cc/JSW7-94UB (last visited Aug. 17, 2017).
112. “The unit of trading shall be 10,000 MMBtu. A delivery tolerance of two
percent (2%) above or below the unit of trading is permitted.” N.Y. MERCANTILE
EXCH., CME GROUP, NYMEX RULEBOOK ch. 220, ¶ 220102.B. (2009).
113. New York Mercantile Exchange is a commodity exchange that trades in
crude oil futures (among many other products), using West Texas Intermediate
(“WTI”) as the traded product, and Cushing, Oklahoma as the delivery point for
purposes of pricing.
114. A British thermal unit, or “Btu,” is a measure of the heat content of fuels.
It is the quantity of heat required to raise the temperature of 1 pound of liquid water
by 1 degree Fahrenheit at the temperature that water has its greatest density
(approximately 39 degrees Fahrenheit). British Thermal Units (Btu), U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/3NKF-SLJ9 (last updated June 13, 2017).
115. The conversion factor of 1.032, as used in the internet illustration, is
suggestive of a relatively low MMBtu factor. In all likelihood, gas of that
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1. Measurement of Oil and Gas
The inherent physical difference between liquid and natural gas
necessitates disparate approaches to the important topic of measuring the
relevant commodity for purposes of accounting and royalty calculations.
a. Rules on the Metering of Oil
The Commissioner of Conservation has issued rules concerning the
installation and use of meters to measure oil production. These rules
include the following as set forth in Chapter 1 of Statewide Order No. 29B as promulgated by the Louisiana Office of Conservation, to-wit:
E.l. Each lease shall be provided with sufficient tankage or meters
to permit proper gauging of the oil produced. The tanks or meters
must be identified by a sign showing the ownership of the tanks
or meters and name of the lease from which the oil is being
produced. In no case shall meters be the sole means of measuring
oil runs from any field. There must be used at least one gauge tank
to check the reading of meters. Applications for the use of oil
meters in lieu of gauge tanks, shall be the subject of open hearings
until rules are formulated.
*

*

*

3. All oil meters and bypass settings shall be provided with the
necessary connections to permit the installation of seals and such
seals shall be affixed by the operator. A record shall be kept on
file and available for inspection by any agent of the department116
or any party at interest for a period of not less than three years,
which reflects the oil meter seal number, the date and time the oil
meter is sealed, the date and time the seal is broken and the reason
for breaking the seal. To obviate the necessity of affixing oil meter
seals, oil meters with nonresettable counters may be used.117

character has probably been processed through a gas plant, with most natural gas
liquids removed.
116. Formerly called the Department of Conservation, the Office of
Conservation was established as a governmental office within the Department of
Natural Resources in connection with the reorganization of state government in
1976. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36:351-358.
117. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 119.E.1, E.3 (2017).
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b. Rules on the Metering of Gas
Louisiana law provides that gas produced in the state, and then sold,
must be measured. Thus, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:44
requires that all “gas produced from the deposits of this state when sold
shall be measured by meter” and further empowers the Commissioner to
“make such regulations for delivery, metering and equitable purchase and
taking as conditions may necessitate.”118
The rules of the Office of Conservation (and the Form OGP associated
therewith) require that the operator report natural gas in terms of thousand
cubic feet (Mcf).119
A “cubic foot of gas” is defined in Louisiana Revised Statutes section
30:47, as follows:
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:47. Cubic foot of gas defined
A. The term “cubic foot of gas” or “standard cubic foot of gas”
means the volume of gas contained in one cubic foot of space at a
standard pressure base and at a standard temperature base. The
standard pressure base shall be 15.025 pounds per square inch
absolute and the standard temperature base shall be sixty degrees
Fahrenheit.
B. Whenever the conditions of pressure and temperature differ
from the above standard, conversion of the volume from these
conditions to the standard conditions shall be made in accordance
with the Ideal Gas Laws with correction for deviation from
Boyle’s Law, which correction must be made unless the pressure
at the point of measurement is two hundred pounds per square inch
gauge, or less; all in accordance with methods and tables generally
recognized by and commonly used in the natural gas industry.
C. For all purposes of computing standard cubic feet of gas under
this Part the barometric pressure shall be assumed to be 14.7
pounds per square inch absolute at the place of measurement.120

118. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:44 (2017).
119. Official Instruction K to Form OGP provides, “Report all Natural Gas
and Casinghead Gas volumes in MCF at 15.025 pounds absolute pressure and 60
degrees Fahrenheit.” See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:49 (1992), quoted
hereafter.
120. Id. at § 30:47.
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Noting the reference in section B of this statute to the “Ideal Gas Laws
with correction for deviation from Boyle’s Law,”121 it is certainly an
understatement to observe that these matters of physics are well beyond
the scope of this paper, and certainly beyond the ability of this writer to
expound upon them.122
Further context to these matters is set forth in Louisiana Revised
Statutes sections 30:48-:50. Section 48 tasks the Commissioner with the
responsibility to determine the “average specific gravity” and the “average
flowing temperature” of flowing gas and to promulgate field rules to
address these issues.
Section 49 requires the operator to “report such volumes [of gas
production] in number of thousands of standard cubic feet calculated and
determined” in accordance with applicable law and the rules of the
Commissioner promulgated relative thereto.
It is also provided, in section 50, that “gas shall be measured,
calculated, purchased, delivered, and accounted for on the basis of a
standard cubic foot of gas,” as defined in section 47, noted above. Penalties
are provided for non-compliance with this regulatory requirement.
The protocols to ensure the integrity of measuring techniques are
addressed in two relevant statutes. Thus, it is required that, with respect to
“all orifice-type meters123 used to measure the production of gaseous
mineral hydrocarbons, the differential pressure recording device of said

121. Boyle’s Law, also called Mariotte’s Law, expresses a relation concerning
the compression and expansion of a gas at constant temperature. This empirical
relation, formulated by the physicist Robert Boyle in 1662, states that the pressure
(p) of a given quantity of gas varies inversely with its volume (v) at constant
temperature; i.e., in equation form, pv = k, a constant. The correlation between
temperature and volume of natural gas was discovered and developed by the French
physicist Edme Mariotte (1676). Boyle’s Law, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://perma.cc/X476-FL9E (last visited Aug. 23, 2017).
122. While these matters are of vital interest to petroleum engineers and others,
the relevant aspects of these principles are incorporated into the statutes in terms
that permit an operator to understand and comply with these standards. For present
purposes, it is appropriate to note that the statutory definition of a “cubic foot of
gas” clearly involves the interrelationship between volume, pressure, and
temperature.
123. Also called an “orifice plate,” this meter measures volumetric flow,
although it can also calculate mass flow depending on the calculation associated
with the device. The flow is determined through the difference in pressure
between the upstream and the downstream side of a partly impeded pipe.
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meters shall be zeroed [as of] each chart changing date, [with] the record
thereof to be disclosed on the chart of each meter.”124
Additionally, all “equipment used for the measuring of the production
from the lease of gaseous mineral hydrocarbons sold or otherwise utilized
off the lease shall be tested, and repaired and corrected, if necessary, not
less than one time within each 6-month period.”125
Taken together, these statutes constitute the protocols and standards
by which production is to be measured in Louisiana to ensure that each
owner is fairly and equitably allocated its share of production.
The measurement of produced gas was at issue in Wegman v. Central
Transmission, Inc., a case in which the lessee was, at a minimum,
haphazard in its metering protocols.126 There, the jury awarded the lessors
the sum of $226,000 (later reduced to $135,000) and dissolved the mineral
leases. On appeal, the court observed, as follows:
According to the various contracts and leases, CTI, or its agent, was
required to properly measure the gas produced. LSA-R.S. 30:44.
Furthermore, CTI was responsible for insuring [sic] that each meter
was properly zeroed.127 LSA-R.S. 30:251. This was not done.
Moreover, CTI comingled the gas produced by various lessees
without obtaining proper permits from the Department of
Conservation as required by the Department of Conservation Order
No. 29–D (March 11, 1955). Because CTI failed to determine the
correct amount of gas produced from the B.J. Hodge lease, the jury
must determine the correct amount.
While the supplemental contracts are not applicable to these wells,
there is an adequate evidentiary foundation for the jury’s
determination. The jury was presented expert testimony on the issue
of measurement. The experts testified that line loss should not
exceed five percent.128 Several experts testified that the usual
amount of line loss would be two percent or less. Thus, the expert
opinion presented and the provisions of the supplemental
agreement form an adequate basis for the jury’s determination that
124. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:251 (1958).
125. Id. at § 30:252.
126. 499 So. 2d 436 (La. Ct. App. 1986), writ denied 503 So. 2d 478 (La. 1987).
127. To “zero” a meter is to return its starting base of measurement to zero so
that each day or other period of production is properly measured, independent of
any other day’s production.
128. “Line loss” is the “amount of gas lost in a distribution system or pipeline.”
MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 60.
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quantity should be measured by the reading of the well charts minus
three percent.129
2. Other Conservation Issues
One of the principal goals or objectives of the Conservation Act is that
the Commissioner must endeavor to protect the correlative rights of parties
having interests in a common pool or reservoir.130 At its core, this means
that the Commissioner should seek to ensure that a party has the opportunity
to “obtain the tract’s just and equitable share of the production of the pool.”131
In certain circumstances, this necessitates the metering of production.
a. Commingling of Oil and Gas
A particular circumstance that involves the use of metering systems is
the commingling of production with permission of the Commissioner of
Conservation. Pursuant to his statutory authority to “require interested
persons to place uniform meters of a type approved by the commissioner
wherever the [C]ommissioner designates,”132 the Commissioner has issued
Statewide Order No. 29-D-1 that regulates the “commingling of oil and gas
production onshore.”133 “Commingling” is defined in that Order as “the
combination of gas and/or liquid hydrocarbon production before sales from
two or more leases and/or units,” subject to certain exceptions.134
This Order further provides: that “permission to commingle gas and/or
liquid hydrocarbons and to use metering, well test or other methods for
allocation of production may be obtained as hereinafter provided and upon
strict compliance with the procedures set forth herein.”135
Among other requirements to be met by the applicant for a commingling
order is the submission of “a diagrammatic sketch of the mechanical
installation to be used along with a detailed explanation of the flow of the
gas and/or liquid hydrocarbons, the procedures and frequency for

129. 499 So. 2d at 449-50.
130. “Landowners and others with rights in a common reservoir or deposit of
minerals have correlative rights and duties with respect to one another in the
development and production of the common source of minerals.” LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 31:9 (1975).
131. Id. at § 30:9D.
132. Id. at § 30:3(14).
133. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 1501, et seq (2017).
134. Id. at § 1503A.
135. Id. at § 1505A.
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calibration/proving of metering devices and allocation formula to be
utilized.”136
Finally, the Commissioner’s Order also states that “[a]ll allocation
measurements must be in accordance with the American Petroleum Institute
(API) Manual of Petroleum Measurement Standards, Chapter 20, Allocation
Measurement.”137
b. “Cross Unit Wells”
“The commissioner has jurisdiction and authority over all persons and
property necessary to enforce effectively the provisions of [the
Conservation Act] and all other laws relating to the conservation of oil or
gas.”138 While the commissioner is invested with a wide array of powers
and responsibilities,139 “[t]he Commissioner of Conservation has only those
powers expressly granted to him by the legislature. Absent a grant of
authority by the legislature, the Commissioner is without authority to
act.”140
The Louisiana Legislature enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes section
30:9.2 in 2015 to authorize the Commissioner of Conservation to “permit
the drilling of cross-unit wells.”141 For these purposes, a “‘[c]ross-unit
well’ means a well drilled horizontally and completed under multiple
drilling units that is designated by the commissioner after notice and public
hearing to serve as a unit well, substitute unit well, or alternate unit well
for said units.”142
The Commissioner of Conservation has issued orders in the Haynesville
Shale in Northwestern Louisiana, authorizing “cross-unit wells” pursuant to
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:9.2 and in accordance with a Policy
Memorandum of the Commissioner of Conservation.143 This Memorandum
sets forth the policy of the office and the procedures for applications for such
136. Id. at § 1505A.1.a.ii.
137. Id. at § 1505A.1.g.
138. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:4A (2015).
139. Id. at § 30:4B, C.
140. Eads Operating Co., Inc. v. Thompson, Comm’r of Conservation of the
State of La., 646 So. 2d 948, 951 (La. Ct. App. 1994), writ denied 652 So. 2d 1345
(La. 1995). In the interest of full disclosure, your author represented the operator
in this suit.
141. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:9.2B (2015).
142. Id. at § 30:9.2A(2).
143. See Memorandum from Commissioner James H. Welsh (Nov. 2, 2012)
(on file with author) (concerning “Horizontal cross unit lateral wells in shales,
tight gas sands and unconventional reservoirs”).
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units. Among other things, the Memorandum states, as follows: “Production
from each cross unit lateral well shall be separated and metered individually
and this information shall be reported to the Office of Conservation in a
manner to be prescribed by this office.”144
Understandably, a principal feature or consideration in the drilling of
a cross unit well is the issue of metering. The current formulation
employed by the Commissioner in orders authorizing such wells is the
following language in the “Definitions” section of the Order, to-wit:
For purposes outlined in the Order promulgated herewith, “perforated length of lateral” shall mean and is hereby defined as the
length of horizontal lateral wellbore wherein perforations have been
made, regardless of the number of perforated stages or individual
perforations, which is measured from the lesser measured depth
perforation or “top of perforations” to the greater measured depth
perforation or “base of perforations.”145
The Order then typically provides, in its “Findings” section (but later
adopted or incorporated by reference in its “Ordering” section), as follows:
Unit production from said cross unit horizontal alternate unit wells
should be allocated to each unit in the same proportion as the
perforated length of the lateral, as defined in the DEFINITIONS
section herein, in that each unit bears to the total length of the
perforated lateral, as determined by an ‘as drilled’ survey performed
after the cross unit wells are drilled and completed; and that unit
production should continue to be shared on a surface acreage basis.
c. Conditional Allowables
Because the perforated borehole of a “cross-unit well”—called a
lateral—“crosses” or traverses a unit boundary, such that different
ownerships are affected, this formulation constitutes a method to allocate
production between the affected units.
It is the practice of the Office of Conservation to issue a “conditional
allowable,” so as to permit an operator to produce a well that is subject to
a pending unitization proceeding prior to the issuance of the order
establishing the compulsory unit for the well. The allowable is subject to
144. Id. at ¶ 3.
145. In the vernacular of the practice, the “top of perforations” is called the
“heel,” while the “base of perforations” is referred to as the “toe” of the horizontal
lateral wellbore.
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the condition that the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of
production from such well be disbursed on a unit basis.
Typically, the operator will seek and obtain an escrow agreement from
all persons who would own an interest in production from the well if it
were produced on a “lease basis,” whereby such owners agree to the
escrow arrangement, thus essentially foregoing the right to receive “lease
basis” royalties on production prior to the effective date of the unit order.
In the absence of some agreement whereby owners of the minerals in or
under the drill site tract manifest such an arrangement, the royalty
obligations of the lessee under the mineral lease (and other contracts)
pertaining to the drill site owner remain unmodified in any respect.
The genesis of this rule pertaining to a “conditional allowable” is a
Memorandum dated April 14, 1983, issued by the Chief Engineer of the
Office of Conservation, Joseph W. Hecker, under direction of (then)
Commissioner Patrick H. Martin, to the effect that “no allowable should
be issued on a lease basis after pre-application or hearing has been filed.”
The rationale behind this policy pertaining to “conditional allowables”
is that, after the filing of a Pre-Application Notice, other parties are
precluded from securing a permit to drill in the area to be affected by the
unitization. Since a party’s right to enforce the “rule of capture” is thereby
abridged, it is only appropriate that they be protected by requiring
disbursement of pre-production on a unit basis.146
Accordingly, whether or not the lessor of a drill site tract that is the
subject of a pending unitization application is entitled, prior to the
effective date of the unit, to be paid on a “lease basis” or a unit basis,
depends on whether the lessor (and other parties owning an interest in production in and to the drill site tract) has signed an escrow agreement in
association with the issuance of a conditional allowable.147

146. See Exxon Corp. v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 387 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied
568 So. 2d 1054 (La. 1990).
147. Gladney v. Anglo-Dutch Energy, L.L.C., 210 So. 3d 903, 910 (La. Ct.
App. 2016), writ denied 218 So. 3d 120 (La. 2017) (“[W]e find the relationship
between Anglo–Dutch and Plaintiffs prior to October 30, 2012, is governed by
the bargained for lease between the two parties. Anglo–Dutch’s obligation to pay
Plaintiffs a one-fifth royalty on all production from the well is modified only upon
the Commissioner’s unitization order’s effective date, October 30, 2012.”).
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3. Adverse Legal Consequences of Inappropriate or Inaccurate
Measurement of Oil and Gas
Fortunately, no court from the Bayou State has considered the adverse
legal consequences resulting from poor metering procedures.148 However,
the need for accurate measurements of production from a distinct well is
illustrated in a recent decision out of Ohio.
In Lang v. Weiss Drilling Co.,149 the lessees, Daniel Weiss and Antero
Resources Corp., ran production from multiple leases through a common
metering system. This obviously disallowed any opportunity to make a
precise determination of the amount of production attributable to any one
of the contributing leases for purposes of ascertaining whether the lease
was producing “in paying quantities.” The court explained that the lessee’s
metering protocols involved running production through a “common
meter,” which necessitated the defendants to pay royalties on an estimated
basis. Defendants, Antero and Weiss, argued as follows:
Antero and Weiss presented evidence that common metering can
be an accepted practice by some oil and gas companies for
purposes of their internal records and paying royalties. But just
because this practice is accepted by some oil and gas companies
does not mean that the trial court had to accept it in this case as a
valid means to measure production for purposes of whether a well
is producing paying quantities of gas. It is reasonable for the court
to require a more accurate method of measuring gas production.
The court must be able to quantify production from the particular
well at issue. It should not be required to guesstimate the amount
of gas attributable to the well in question when the party
responsible for the metering has chosen to use a common meter
for multiple wells as opposed to individual meters for each well.150
Thus, “guesstimates” from a common metering system were held to
be insufficient evidence to maintain the mineral lease in force and effect.
Lest one think that the role of pressure and temperature in the
measurement of natural gas is merely a technical, perhaps non-legal,
consideration, one should consider certain judicial actions putting these
matters at issue in royalty litigation.151
148. But see Wegman, 499 So. 2d 436.
149. 70 N.E.3d 625 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
150. Id. at 633.
151. As stated by one respected commentator, “[a]n essential element of
accurate royalty calculation is accurate measurement of the oil and gas being
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In a matter styled In Re: Natural Gas Royalties Qui Tam Litigation,152
Mr. Grynberg, as “relator,” filed a qui tam action questioning and
challenging the manner in which the defendants measured natural gas on
Federal or Indian lands for purposes of paying royalty to the Federal
government.153 With apologies for length,154 the court explained the
essential factual allegations as put forth by the Relator, as follows:
The current series of complaints filed by Mr. Grynberg are not
entirely uniform, but do share a number of common elements. The
present lawsuits challenge Defendants’ measurement of the
volume and analysis of the heating content of natural gas,
allegedly causing substantial underpayments of royalties to the
United States. Relator contends that in properly calculating those
royalties, it is crucial that the heating content and volume of the
gas be analyzed and measured accurately pursuant to federal law
as well as federal regulations and the industry standards those
regulations incorporate. Relator alleges Defendants have
knowingly (within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b))
underreported the heating content and volume of that gas by
undermeasuring and misanalyzing it in the ways described in
paragraphs 32-54 of his complaints (referred to by Relator as
“Mismeasurement Techniques”).
Natural gas is measured on the basis of two factors: its heating
content and its volume. Heating content is analyzed and expressed
in “British Thermal Units” (“BTU’s”) per cubic foot; volume is
measured in units of one thousand cubic feet (“MCF’s”). To
extracted under the lease to determine the volume on which a royalty is due. See
generally Michael J. Heydt, Overview of Natural Gas Measurement Litigation,
47 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 16-1 (2001).” David E. Pierce, Royalty
Jurisprudence: A Tale of Two States, 49 WASHBURN L. J. 347, 352, n.15 (2010).
152. MDL Docket No. 1293 (D. Wyo.). Internal, irrelevant text, including
cross-references, omitted.
153. A qui tam suit is one brought by a “whistleblower” under the False Claims
Act, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-3733, in which allegations are made that a federal
contractor has committed fraud against the government. The successful plaintiff,
called a “relator,” receives a portion of the recovery.
154. Although admittedly a long quoted passage, it does provide an overview
of the implications of the legal issues arising from the manner in which gas is
measured in reference to its heat content and volume, as well as the context in
which such issues arise. While this case was brought (albeit unsuccessfully) under
the False Claims Act, it is not inconceivable that similar issues could be litigated
or asserted in a private setting.
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calculate the value of a given amount of natural gas one would
multiply the heating content in BTU’s per cubic foot by the
volume in cubic feet, thus creating a product measured in millions
of BTU’s, or “MMBTU’s.” Natural gas has historically been
valued and sold throughout the natural gas industry on the basis
of a price per MMBTU. Pricing on a MMBTU basis has been
prescribed by federal law since implementation of Order 699 by
the Federal Power Commission in 1974.
Relator represents that royalties owing to the United States for
natural gas produced from federal lands have been calculated as a
percentage of the value of the gas so produced, which is directly
affected by the gas’s measured MMBTU’s. Thus, Relator alleges,
accurate techniques for measuring the MMBTU of gas produced
from these properties are required by federal law, as well as by
federal regulations and industry standards, in order to correctly
calculate those royalty payments. Specifically, the Federal Oil and
Gas Royalty Management Act (“FOGRMA”) directs the Secretary
of the Interior to “establish a comprehensive . . . system to provide
the capability to accurately determine oil and gas royalties.” 30
U.S.C. § 1711(a). The Act also imposes penalties on “[a]ny person
who . . . knowingly or willfully prepares, maintains, or submits
false, inaccurate, or misleading reports, notices, affidavits, records,
data, or other written information[.]” 30 U.S.C. § 1719(d).
*

*

*

Under contracts commonly used in the natural gas industry, natural
gas transmission companies and other purchasers, gatherers, and/or
transporters of natural gas (collectively referred to as “Gas
Measurers”) have routinely been responsible for measuring the
volume and analyzing the heating content of gas which they gather,
purchase, and/or transport. Thus, the MMBTU value of natural gas
produced from federal lands has been measured and determined by
Gas Measurers such as Defendants; and those MMBTU
measurements have been used to determine the value of natural gas,
and hence the amount of royalties owing to the United States.
Accordingly, royalty payments to the United States have been made
either by lessees of those lands in reliance on information furnished
by the Gas Measurers, or by the Gas Measurers themselves, on the
basis of their own MMBTU determinations obtained from their gas
volume measurements and gas heating content analyses. Relator
alleges that the Mismeasurement Techniques used by Defendants
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to arrive at those determinations are all inconsistent with federal
law and regulations, as well as industry standards.
Relator also alleges that Defendants measure and analyze natural
gas differently at the point of intake and at the point of later
delivery. Defendants have allegedly been in control of the MMBTU
measurement and analysis process at the point of purchase or input
into a gas gathering line and/or gas pipeline (where royalty
measurements are taken), as well as (directly or through
subsidiaries or affiliates) the process at any later point where the gas
is resold or otherwise conveyed. Relator states that the true heating
content of natural gas should remain the same at any point along its
path. However, by using different techniques, procedures, or
assumptions in the measurement and analysis process, one can
significantly (and inaccurately) alter the results of the gas’s
measured MMBTU value. Such selective measurement and
analysis techniques, yielding a lower MMBTU value at the point of
purchase or input and a higher MMBTU value at the point of resale
or conveyance, result in the unjust enrichment of the Defendants
and/or their affiliates.155
The ultimate resolution of this qui tam action is not relevant for present
purposes, except to note that Mr. Grynberg did not prevail and was cast
for significant attorney’s fees under the “fee-shifting” provisions of the
False Claims Act.156
The Relator in this suit filed numerous actions to the same effect,
making the same fundamental argument. For example, in one case, this
litigant “sued the defendant companies on behalf of the Government,
seeking to recover a portion of natural gas royalties owed the Government,
based on the defendants’ having allegedly mismeasured and falsely
reported the volume and heating content of gas they produced on Indian
lands.”157 That suit was dismissed by the district court on the basis that the

155. In Re: Natural Gas Royalties Qui Tam Litigation, MDL Docket No. 1293,
3-6 (D. Wyo. May 2001) (Order on Motions to Dismiss).
156. In Re: Natural Gas Royalties Qui Tam Litigation, Lead Case No. 15-8054
(10th Cir. Jan. 4, 2017). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the award of attorney’s fees
to certain defendants of “around $5.5 million,” but reversed the award of
attorney’s fees to other defendants “totaling nearly $17 million.”
157. United States of America ex. rel. Jack J. Grynberg v. GPM Gas Corp.,
277 F.3d 1373 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 535 U. S. 1017 (2002).
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Relator “lacked standing under Article III of the [United States] Constitution to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the Government.”158 However, that
ruling was reversed on appeal.159
Concerning these cases, the merits and ultimate resolution thereof are
not particularly important, but the allegations made by the Relator are
instructive as to the ingenuity that certain plaintiffs might bring forth to
address the issue of mismeasurement of natural gas.
4. Produced Gas on Which No Royalty is Due
Certain categories of oil or gas are deducted from the gross volume of
production on which royalty is to be calculated, and hence, that are to be
exempted from the calculation of a royalty payment.160
a. Production Used as Fuel in Well Operations
It is not uncommon that the “Royalty Clause” of a mineral lease permits
the lessee to use a portion of the gas in connection with conducting
operations on the property or in treating oil to make it marketable. Typically,
the gas might be used for “lifting purposes” in order to “lift” oil or gas to the
surface.161
For example, each of the commercially printed forms of the mineral
lease used in South Louisiana162 has, substantially, if not precisely identical,
the following provision, to-wit:
Subject to the provisions of Paragraphs 2 and 10 hereof, the
royalties to be paid by Lessee are: (a) . . . one-eighth (1/8) of that
produced and saved from the land and not used for fuel in
conducting operations on the property (or on acreage pooled
therewith or with any part thereof), or in treating such liquids to
make them marketable; . . . (e) Lessee shall have free use of all oil,
gas or any component thereof used in lease or unit operations as
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Principally involving natural gas rather than oil, these categories are
associated with a variety of acronymic monikers, such as “FLU,” which stands
for “Fuel, Lost, or Unaccounted for,” or “LAUF,” meaning “Lost and
Unaccounted for.”
161. “. . . necessary to lift the oil from the ground.” Stewart v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 604 P.2d 854, 857, n.8 (Okla. 1980).
162. These are usually called “Bath forms,” a reference to the printer of the
forms—the M.L. Bath Printing Co., Shreveport, Louisiana.

2017]

CALCULATING THE LESSOR’S ROYALTY PAYMENT

43

well as gas, including the components thereof, injected into
subsurface strata as hereinafter defined; . . . Lessee shall have the
right to inject gas, water, brine or other fluids into subsurface
strata, and no royalties shall be due or computed on any gas or
component thereof produced by Lessee and injected into
subsurface stratum or strata through a well or wells located either
on the land or a pooled unit containing all or a part of the land.163
In this regard, the North Louisiana form provides as follows: “Lessee
shall have free use of oil, gas, casinghead gas, condensate, and water from
said land, except water from Lessor’s wells, for all operations hereunder,
including repressuring, pressure maintenance and recycling, and the
royalty shall be computed after deducting any so used.”164
As a corollary to the foregoing explicit exclusion of fuel gas from the
operation of the “Royalty Clause,” royalty is typically only imposed on
gas that is “produced and saved,” or that is “sold,” or words to that effect.
Quite evidently, gas that is used as fuel is not gas that is “saved” or “sold.”
To be sure, by the express terms of the commercial form of mineral
lease utilized in North Louisiana,
such gas, casinghead gas, residue gas, or gas of any other nature
or description whatsoever, as may be disposed of for no
consideration to Lessee, either through unavoidable waste or
leakage, or in order to recover oil or other liquid hydrocarbons,
or returned to the ground, shall not be deemed to have been sold
or used either on or off the premises within the meaning of this
paragraph 4 hereof. 165
In other words, no royalty is due in respect of such gas.
Although the issue was presented in the context of Federal regulations
pertinent to Federal offshore leases (and not in a private context), a Federal
District Court in Louisiana found “that the decision by the Department to
require payment of royalty on Lost and Used Hydrocarbons is arbitrary
and capricious, and is therefore contrary to the law . . . .”166

163. Paragraph 7, Bath 4B and 6 Forms (emphasis added).
164. Paragraph 9, North Form (emphasis added).
165. Paragraph 4, North Form (emphasis added).
166. Amoco Production Co. v. Andrus, 527 F. Supp. 790, 797 (E.D. La. 1981)
(concerning a provision of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act requiring the
payment of royalty of not less than 12-1/2% “in the amount or value of the
production saved, removed, or sold from the lease;” see 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (2012)).
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b. Lost and Unaccounted for Production
Some portion of the gas produced from a well will often be lost or
unaccounted for through the normal processes of production or transportation.
As stated in a recent Texas case,167 “[g]as lost and unaccounted for is the gas
lost between the wellhead and the point of sale.”168
Unaccounted for gas loss represents the mathematical difference between
the amount of gas entering a pipeline system and the amount representing the
output. For example, if 100 units of gas are input into a system, and ninetyfive units are output, there is an “unaccounted for” loss of five units of
production.
The issue of whether royalty is due on gas that is lost or used has not
arisen in Louisiana. However, in Hall v. CNX Gas Co., LLC,169 a
Pennsylvania court held that no royalties are due on gas that is lost or used in
operations on the leased premises, explaining its ruling as follows:
Hence, with regard to the lost and used gas specifically, we find
no ambiguity or missing allocation term in the Hall lease. The
language providing for royalties to be calculated on the net
amount realized at the point of sale obviates the need for a term
allocating lost and used gas.170
C. Price per Unit of Product
The next factor in the calculation of a lessor’s royalty payment is to
apply the pertinent price per measured unit of production to the quantity of
oil or gas being produced.
While the terms of the “Royalty Clause” control,171 two principal
considerations are presented in this regard. First, to what have the parties
agreed with respect to the benchmark for pricing to be applied to the royalty
obligations of the lessee? Second, how are those prices to be determined,
and where may they be found?

167. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Hyder, 427 S.W.3d 472 (Tex. Ct. App.
– San Antonio 2014), aff’d 483 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. 2015).
168. Id. at 481.
169. 137 A.3d 597 (Pa. 2016).
170. Id. at 604. See also Chesapeake Exploration, 427 S.W.3d at 482 (“Gas
lost or unaccounted for is neither sold nor used.”).
171. “Contracts have the effect of law for the parties.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
1983 (2017). See also OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at ch. 2.
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1. Basis of Royalty Determination
What is the basis of determination of the pricing pertinent to the royalty
payment due to the lessor? This integral question puts forth another area
where much could be written.172 For present purposes, a brief overview of
this important topic is set forth.
With regard to the price per measured unit of production, a “Royalty
Clause” in a mineral lease in Louisiana typically will take one of two basic
formulations, viz., the monetary price of the royalty is determined either on
the basis of (a) “market value at the well” or (b) “proceeds realized” by the
lessee.
a. Market Value
In the “Royalty Clause” of a commercially printed form of mineral
lease in prevalent use in Louisiana, royalty on gas is stated to be the
stipulated fraction “of the market value of the gas sold or used by Lessee
in operations not connected with the land leased or any pooled unit
containing a portion of said land.”173
In the “Royalty Clause” of another lease form, the following is
provided with respect to royalty on certain gas types:
[G]as produced from or attributable to said land and sold,
including the gas remaining after the extraction of hydrocarbon
products therefrom, [shall be the royalty fraction] of the market
value at the mouth of the well of the gas so sold, including
casinghead gas or other gaseous substances. The price to be used
in computing the market value at the mouth of the well shall be the
price received by Lessee under an arms’ length gas sales contract
prudently negotiated in the light of the facts and circumstances
existing at the time of consummation of such contract; . . . .”174
In the form in prevalent use in North Louisiana,
[The basis for royalty] on gas, including casinghead gas, or other
gaseous substance produced from said land and sold or used off
the premises or for the extraction of gasoline or other products
therefrom, [is] the market value at the well [of the royalty fraction]
of the gas so sold or used, provided that on gas sold at the wells
172. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-25(d)(5).
173. Paragraph 7(b), Bath 4B Form (emphasis added).
174. Paragraph 7(b), Bath 6 Form (emphasis added).
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the royalty shall be [the royalty fraction] of the amount realized
from such sale . . . .175
In Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sartor,176 the following discussion
ensued as to the meaning of the term “market value:”
As applied to this case, the term “market price” is interchangeable
with the term “market value.” In the nature of things there could
be no open market for natural gas. It is admitted there are no
exchange quotations or other evidence to be obtained of open and
notorious market prices at which any one desiring gas could
purchase it, as would be available in the sale of other commodities.
In this situation the modern rule is that value may be shown by
evidence of other sales, provided the conditions are substantially
similar, but not otherwise.177
Another definition of the term “market value” was put forth in Henry
v. The Ballard & Cordell Corp.,178 as being “the price which it might be
expected to bring if offered for sale in the market.”179
b. Price Realized
Also called a “proceeds” lease, an example is set forth in the
significant case of Frey v. Amoco Production Co.180 In the Frey lease, the
“Royalty Clause” obligated the lessee to pay to the lessor “royalty on gas
sold by the Lessee of one-fifth (1/5) of the amount realized at the well from
such sales.”181
Under a “Royalty Clause” in which the lessor is to be compensated on
the basis of the price realized or received by the lessee, the lessee, in
discharging its duty to prudently market the production, will essentially
fix the price on the basis of which the lessor will be compensated by way
of royalty. While the amount actually received by the lessee as a result of
a good faith sales transaction will govern the calculation, it will still be

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Paragraph 4(b), North Form.
78 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1935).
Id. at 927.
418 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1982).
Id. at 1337.
603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992).
Id. at 170.
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subject to a lessor’s inquiry under the auspices of article 122 of the
Louisiana Mineral Code.182
2. Source for Determination of the Relevant Benchmark Price
Having identified the relevant benchmark, where (that is, from what
source) does the lessee ascertain the value of the product for purposes of
the “Royalty Clause?”
a. Posted Price
Historically, the price at which the lessee sells oil is based upon the
“posted price” in the field. More often than not, the posted price is more
artificial than it is based in reality. The price is “posted” in the sense that
it is announced or published by the purchaser–often the lessee itself, or an
affiliate of the lessee–by some publication, including electronic bulletin
boards.
The term “posted price,” as defined by the leading commentators on
oil and gas law, means “[a] written statement of crude petroleum prices
circulated publicly among sellers and buyers of crude petroleum in a
particular field in accordance with historic practices, and generally known
by sellers and buyers within the field.”183
Over the last few decades, the practice of “posting” a specific
prevailing price “in the field” for crude oil has now evolved to pricings
being embodied in “assessments” based upon broad types or grades of oil
in general marking areas. The regulations of the Department of Revenue
continue to provide the following definition of “posted price,” albeit for
purposes of the assessment of severance taxes:
LA. ADMIN. CODE § 61:I.2903A
Posted Field Price—a statement of crude oil prices circulated
among buyers and sellers of crude petroleum and is generally
known by buyers and sellers within the field as being the posted
price. The posted field price is the actual price of crude petroleum
advertised for a field. The area price is a statement of crude oil
prices circulated among buyers and sellers of crude petroleum
listing prices for different areas of the state, usually listed as north
Louisiana and south Louisiana, and generally known among
182. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 3-13(e)(4).
183. MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 60.
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buyers and sellers within the area as the posted price. This area
price is the beginning price for crude petroleum of an area before
adjustments for kind and quality (including, but not limited to,
gravity adjustments) of the crude petroleum. When no actual
posted field price is advertised or issued by a purchaser, the area
price less adjustments for kind or quality (including, but not
limited to, gravity adjustments) becomes the posted field price. 184
In recognition of the fact that the contracting parties, at the inception
of the lease relationship, might not know if a price has been (or will in the
future be) posted or published for the field in which the leased premises is
located, alternative formulations might be put forth in the mineral lease.
Thus, in Bailey v. Franks Petroleum Inc.,185 the “Royalty Clause” of the
mineral lease read:
Subject to the provisions of Paragraphs 2 and 11 hereof, royalties
to be paid by Lessee are:
(a) One-fifth (1/5) of all oil, distillate, condensate and other liquid
hydrocarbons howsoever produced and saved from the leased
premises to be delivered to Lessor in storage tanks furnished by
Lessee at its cost, or any pipe line in the field free of all cost or
charge, or, at Lessor’s option, purchased by Lessee at the price
prevailing for the field on the day it is run to the pipe line or
storage tank, or if there be no posted price for the field, the
average price for Gulf Coast Fields of Louisiana for oil, distillate,
condensate or other liquid hydrocarbons of same grade and
gravity, without any deduction for treatment or transportation
costs. All oil and condensate shall be measured in tanks, and liquid
meters shall not be used without Lessor’s consent.186
While the determination of a lessor’s royalty payment based on the
posted price was an accepted practice for many years, litigation has ensued
in recent years in which lessors have challenged the posted price as being
an inappropriate benchmark, not representative of market value for the oil
produced.
The most significant case in Louisiana on posted price, as a benchmark
to account to a lessor, arose out of a royalty demand issued by the
184. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 61, pt. XXIX, § 2903A (2017).
185. 479 So. 2d 563. In the interest of full disclosure, your author represented
the defendant-lessee in this suit.
186. Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
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Department of Natural Resources of the State of Louisiana against its
lessee, Chevron. In the suit that followed,187 tried before a jury, the State
contended that Chevron “cheated” it out of royalties for over a decade.188
This conduct was based on the payment by Chevron of royalties tethered
to the posted price at Chevron’s Port Fourchon facility near Golden
Meadow, Louisiana, rather than on market value as established by the sale
of the oil to other purchasers (principally British Petroleum and Exxon).
The dispute commenced when the State made demand on Chevron in
June of 2001 for almost thirty million dollars in royalties from the Bay
Marchand Field operated by Chevron.189 In response, Chevron paid
additional royalties to the State in the amount of fifteen million dollars and
concurrently filed a declaratory judgment190 seeking return of the monies
paid.191
According to newspaper accounts,192 Chevron sought to justify the
price on which royalties were calculated, based on its lawyer’s argument
that, after the point of production, “Chevron mingled the oil from its Bay
Marchand field off the coast of Lafourche Parish with a better grade of oil
which it then sold for more than the price it had posted before blending.”193
This same newspaper report captured the lessee’s argument, clearly
pitched to a Lafourche Parish jury, that “selling oil that was mingled with

187. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. State of Louisiana, No. 93,658, (La. Dist. Ct. 2004).
188. Although a claim for royalties is subject to a liberative prescription of
three years, see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3494(5) (2017), that period does not
apply to a state royalty claim as per the explicit text of this article. Additionally,
our constitution stipulates that “[p]rescription shall not run against the state in any
civil matter, unless otherwise provided in this constitution or expressly by law.”
LA. CONST. art. XII, § 13 (1974).
189. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:137 (1975). See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE
TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 13-28.
190. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. State of Louisiana, No. 93,658, (La. Dist. Ct. 2004).
191. It is unclear if Chevron paid the disputed royalties “under protest.”
“Louisiana law does not permit a party to recover voluntary payments merely
because payment was made under protest.” Bickham v. Wash. Bank & Trust Co.,
515 So. 2d 457 (La. Ct. App. 1987). See also DLJ of La. No. 1 v. Green Thumb,
Inc., 376 So. 2d 121, 123 (La. 1979) (Dennis, J., concurring) (citing the seminal
case on this proposition, New Orleans & N.E.R. Co. v. La. Const. Imp. Co., 33
So. 51 (La. 1902), where it was stated that “[i]t is elementary that a voluntary
payment of money under a claim of right cannot, in general, be recovered back.”).
192. John McMillan, State Wants Chevron to Pay $100 million, End Oilfield
Lease, THE ADVOCATE, Mar. 2, 2004; John McMillan, Jury Finds Chevron
Defrauded State of Oil Royalties, THE ADVOCATE, Mar. 19, 2004.
193. Id.
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a higher grade was similar to buying live crawfish, purging the crawfish,
then cooking, peeling and packaging the mudbugs before selling them at
higher prices.”194
That interesting allegory was unavailing in Thibodaux, Louisiana. The
jury answered, in the affirmative, the interrogatories as to whether
“Chevron’s original failure to pay the full amount of royalties due to the
State of Louisiana was fraudulent,” and “willful and without reasonable
grounds,”195 awarding the State in excess of eighty-two million dollars
(royalties due, plus double royalties as damages, and interest),196 plus
attorney’s fees in excess of twenty million dollars. Chevron settled the
case after verdict.
Another case considered similar allegations,197 but the reported
decision addressed only the issue of the propriety of giving written notice
of non-payment on a class-wide basis.198
b. Marketing through Affiliates199
As in the case of posted prices, issues arise when the lessee sells its
production to an affiliated entity. For these purposes, an “affiliate” is a
legal entity owned or controlled by, or under the control of, the lessee. The
opportunity for coziness comes to mind, as does the proverbial “brotherin-law deal.”
In Tyson v. Surf Oil Co.,200 the lessor sued his lessee complaining
about the lessee’s failure to pay royalties properly. The lessee produced

194. Id.
195. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. State of Louisiana, No. 93,658, (La. Dist. Ct.
2004) (Judgment dated April 13, 2004).
196. As to the propriety of trebling (rather than merely doubling) the royalties,
see OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 13-30(c).
197. Duhe’ v. Texaco, Inc., 779 So. 2d 1070, 1073 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied
791 So. 2d 637 (La. 2001). The decision indicates that the “petitions claim that
beginning March 23, 1988, Texaco and its producing affiliate, TEPI, underpaid
oil royalties by valuing the amounts due the royalty owners on self-dealing, lowpriced transfers of their oil from TEPI to Texaco Trading and Transportation, Inc.
(TTTI), another wholly owned Texaco subsidiary. They claim that the calculation
and payment of royalties was based on an internal transfer price, TTTI’s posted
price, instead of a better price, which they describe generally as market value, and
that the TTTI posted price was less than market value.”
198. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 13-28(f).
199. See id. at § 4-25(d)(6)(x).
200. 196 So. 336 (La. 1940).
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gas and sold it to its affiliated companies. The Louisiana Supreme Court
observed that a named individual “was the moving spirit of all three of
defendant affiliated companies, and that he fixed the price of gas at which
[the purchaser] would pay for it.”201 The Court held that the sale of gas “at
one cent per thousand cubic feet was without the consent of the plaintiffs,
[and] the price is not binding on plaintiffs and they are entitled to recover
a fair market value for the gas at the well where produced.”202
D. Lessor’s Fractional Interest in Minerals203
1. Preface
As a foundational article in the Mineral Code, it is established that
“[o]wnership of land does not include ownership of oil, gas, and other
minerals occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous form . . . . The landowner
has the exclusive right to explore and develop his property for the
production of such minerals and to reduce them to possession and
ownership.”204
It is also recognized that a “landowner may . . . lease his right to
explore and develop his land for production of minerals and to reduce them
to possession.”205
“A mineral lease may be granted by a person having an executive
interest in the mineral rights on the property leased.”206
“A mineral servitude is the right of enjoyment of land belonging to
another for the purpose of exploring for and producing minerals and
reducing them to possession and ownership.”207
Taken together, these statutes give rise to the necessity to ascertain the
interest of the lessor in the minerals in and to the lands made subject to the
mineral lease. If the lessor owns the entirety of the rights to minerals in the
land, this inquiry ends here, such that this component (for formulaic
purposes) is “1.0.”

201. Id. at 339.
202. Id.
203. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-30.
204. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:6 (1975).
205. Id. at § 31:15.
206. Id. at § 31:116.
207. Id. at § 31:21. See PATRICK S. OTTINGER, Mineral Servitudes, in LOUISIANA
MINERAL LAW TREATISE, ch. 4 (Patrick H. Martin, ed., 2012) [hereinafter OTTINGER,
Mineral Servitudes].
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However, if the lessor does not own the rights to minerals in the land
in their entirety, it is because either the lessor’s land is subject to a mineral
servitude to some fractional extent, or the lessor only owns an undivided
interest in the land, with the balance being owned by other co-owners.208
While the “Proportionate Reduction Clause” of a mineral lease is the
contractual authority for the right of the lessee to reduce payments under
the mineral lease to the lessor, where the lessor does not own all rights to
the minerals in and under the leased property, it does not generally
appertain to royalty payments. Rather, royalty payments are calculated
with respect to the title of the lessor, without regard to the existence of a
“Proportionate Reduction Clause.”
Said differently, a royalty payment is based on the determination of
the lessor’s entitlement to revenue, an issue that principally takes into
consideration the lessor’s title to the tract of land in question and the
existence of any real burdens thereon. Whatever its significance in other
contexts,209 the “Proportionate Reduction Clause” of a mineral lease
generally has no pertinence in this regard.
2. Outstanding Burdens on Interest of the Lessor
It is also necessary to ascertain if the lessor’s interest in minerals is
subject to the rights of others, as this would necessarily reduce or diminish
the net revenue interest to which the lessor is entitled. Typically, such a
diminution results from the creation of a mineral royalty by the lessor or
its ancestor-in-title.210
A mineral royalty is recognized by the Louisiana Mineral Code as one
of the three “basic” mineral rights that might be created by a landowner.211
As such, a mineral royalty is a real right212 and an incorporeal immovable.213
Being an incorporeal immovable, all of the laws pertinent to immovables
apply to the mineral royalty, including requisites for creation, transfer and
registry.214
208. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Oil in the Family--Obtaining the Requisite
Consent to Conduct Operations on Co-Owned Land or Mineral Servitudes, 73
LA. L. REV. 745 (2013).
209. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-30.
210. See OTTINGER, Mineral Royalties, supra note 11.
211. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:16 (1975).
212. Id.
213. Id. at § 31:18.
214. “Mineral rights, including mineral leases, are classified under the Mineral
Code as incorporeal immovables and are subject to the Civil Code articles
respecting immovable property.” Guy Scroggins, Inc. v. Emerald Exploration,
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Commenting on the early confusion relative to the nature of royalty,
Professor Daggett remarked as follows:
The confusion regarding royalty seems to have its roots in the
notion, correct as far as it goes, that royalty is the equivalent of
rent. So it is; but this rent in mineral leases is but a percentage of
production from the land . . . . It usually becomes ultimately
attached to a lease, as few landowners are producers. But it does
not have to have a present lease nor need it have an ultimate lease
upon which to ground its being, because its interest is in the
production, by whatever method that may be achieved.215
A mineral royalty is now defined in article 80 of the Louisiana Mineral
Code, as follows:
Art. 80. Nature of mineral royalty
A mineral royalty is the right to participate in production of minerals
from land owned by another or land subject to a mineral servitude
owned by another. Unless expressly qualified by the parties, a royalty
is a right to share in gross production free of mining or drilling and
production costs.216
The seminal case involving the mineral royalty is the case of Vincent
v. Bullock.217 There, the plaintiffs transferred land on February 22, 1927.
In this deed, the plaintiffs reserved “in perpetuity, a one-sixteenth (1/16th)
royalty of all the oil, gas and other minerals produced and saved” from the
land.218
At issue was the legal nature of the interest reserved by the plaintiffs,
i.e., whether it was or was not subject to any sort of prescriptive regime.
Plaintiffs contended that the reservation in the February 22, 1927, deed
[did] not fall in the legal category of a servitude, subject to the
prescription of ten years for non-use, but characterize[d] it (1) as
being in the nature of a rent charge to become operative should oil
or other minerals be produced, (2) or being in the nature of a
401 So. 2d 680, 684 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied 404 So. 2d 1257 (La. 1981). In
the interest of full disclosure, your author represented the defendant in this suit.
215. HARRIET SPILLER DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA § 61 (Rev.
Ed. 1949).
216. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:80 (1975).
217. 187 So. 35 (La. 1939).
218. Id. at 37.
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servitude contingent upon a future happening, i. e. the production
of oil, gas or other minerals, and (3) or as * * * being in the nature
of a purchase of real rights to come and not in esse, or real right
based on an uncertain happening * * *.219
After reviewing certain general legal principles pertaining to the law
of obligations and ownership, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated, “We
therefore conclude that plaintiffs, by the reservation made in the transfer
of their property by deed of February 22, 1927, imposed on the property a
real obligation which passed with the property into the hands of the present
owner.”220
The Court turned “to the consideration of the question as to whether
the prescription of ten years, liberandi causa, is applicable to the case at
hand and if so, whether or not the same has been interrupted.”221 The Court
explained that the “reservation in controversy here . . . is a real obligation
in favor of the plaintiffs, their heirs or assigns, and in our opinion is a
species of real right subject to the prescription of ten years, liberandi causa,
within the meaning and contemplation of the Revised Civil Code. . . .” The
Court further stated as follows:
It is argued by some that as a royalty owner, unlike the owner of
a mineral servitude, cannot go upon the land for the purpose of
exploring for the minerals but must await such time as the
landowner has developed it or caused the same to be done, and
then if there be production to claim his royalty interest, the
prescription is suspended and does not begin to run until some
minerals are developed and produced, because until such time the
reserver has no claim to enforce. Some are of the opinion that
because the royalty owner does not have the right to explore the
land for minerals, this court, in order to apply the prescription,
would have to ignore the doctrine of “obstacle” of the Revised
Civil Code. Others argue that when the landowner grants a real
interest to a third party, because of the nature of such obligation,
there is an implied obligation growing out of the contractual
relation of the parties that the grantor or his heirs or assigns will
use the land with reference to the royalty as a prudent
administrator and that as such it is incumbent upon the owner to
lease the lands for mineral development when an opportunity to
do so presents itself and can absolve himself from the application
219. Id.
220. Id. at 40.
221. Id.
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of the prescription liberandi causa only by showing that he had no
opportunity to lease the premises for mineral development.222
Chief Justice Fournet, the author of this seminal Louisiana Supreme
Court decision, has admitted that the ruling was the result of a pre-opinion
judicial conference in which the Justices decided the result to be reached in
the case, but left to the Chief Justice the construction of a theory to follow
in order to reach the pre-ordained result. At a conference on mineral law,
Chief Justice Fournet stated:
In accordance with our system of assigning cases by rotation, it fell
to me. The court, without determining how the conclusion was to be
reached, instructed me, in terms amounting to an ultimatum, to find
a way to cut off this new right by the same prescription applicable to
the mineral servitude, of which it was an appendage as it were.223
The Court provided further elucidation on the nature of the mineral
royalty in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Guillory.224 In that significant
case, Guillory sold to Garland, on January 19, 1923, an
undivided one-fourth interest in and to all royalties stipulated for
or hereafter to be stipulated for, in any oil, gas or mineral lease
that may be or has been executed by vendor in favor of third
persons and more particularly in that certain lease executed in
favor of the Louisiana Oil and Refining Corporation . . . .225
The instrument further recited as follows:
It being well understood and agreed that the interest herein
conveyed is and will remain an interest in all contracts by the
vendor with third persons for the exploration and development of
the said lands for oil, gas or other minerals, the proceeds of the
rental of the said land for said purposes, but only to share in the
royalties in the proportions above set forth. This grant to be
continuous and to run with the land into whomsoever’s hands it
may fall; by assignment, bequest, devise or otherwise.226

222. Id. at 41-42.
223. John B. Fournet, Institute Dinner Address, 2 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 89,
93 (1954).
224. 33 So. 2d 182 (La. 1947).
225. Id. at 183.
226. Id.

56

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. VI

The Court, on original hearing, held that a provision purporting to
impose the royalty on any future mineral lease, beyond the lease that was
in effect on the date of the deed, was ineffective. The Court explained,
“We have therefore concluded that the deed is null because it attempts to
transfer a perpetual royalty in future leases and for the further ground that
it contains a potestative condition227 that is reprobated by law.”228
On rehearing, the Court reversed itself and held that the rules
pertaining to potestative conditions did not render null such a clause. The
clause was upheld, with the Court stating:
In the usual mineral royalty deed the purchaser does not receive
from the landowner an obligation to drill or to grant a lease for
exploration purposes. All that he acquires is a right attached to the
land and the assurance that he will receive his share of the oil
produced therefrom if and when successful production results.229
Most royalty deeds contain a clause such as the following, to-wit:
This sale and transfer is made and accepted subject to an oil, gas
and mineral lease now affecting said Property, but the royalties
hereinabove described shall be delivered and/or paid to the
purchaser out of and deducted from the royalties reserved to the
lessor in said lease. This sale and transfer, however, is not limited
to royalties accruing under the lease presently affecting said
Property, but the rights herein granted are and shall remain a
charge and burden on the Property herein described and binding
on any future owners or lessees of said Property and, in the event
of the termination of the present lease, the said royalties shall be
delivered and/or paid out of the whole of any oil, gas or other
minerals produced from said Property by the owner, lessee or
anyone else operating thereon.
To illustrate, if the lessor owns all rights to the minerals in the leased
land, either as a landowner230 or the owner of a mineral servitude,231 and
grants a mineral royalty for 1/32 of the oil, gas, and other minerals in the
227. Prior to the 1984 amendments to the Civil Code articles on obligations,
former codal articles characterized as “potestative” a condition that was subject
to the whim of the obligor. That characterization was eliminated with the
enactment of article 1770 of the Civil Code.
228. 33 So. 2d at 184.
229. Id. at 192.
230. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:6 (1975).
231. Id. at § 31:21. See also OTTINGER, Mineral Servitudes, supra note 207.

2017]

CALCULATING THE LESSOR’S ROYALTY PAYMENT

57

land, and thereafter executes a mineral lease providing for a one-fourth
(1/4) lessor’s royalty, then, upon the attainment of production, the interest
of the lessor in production would be calculated, as follows: 1/4 minus 1/32,
equals 7/32.
In Part II.D.2 hereof, significant consideration is given to the situation in
which a lessor’s gross royalty payment is reduced in respect of an outstanding
burden on the lessor’s interest, such as a mineral royalty interest.
3. Freeing of the Lessor’s Land from a Burden
In the context of calculating the gross royalty payment, it is necessary
to also examine the “flip side of that coin,” that being the consequence of
the extinguishment of a mineral royalty prior to the commencement of
production from a well on or attributable to the burdened tract of land and
the consequential removal from the lessor’s mineral interest of such real
charge or burden.
“Prescription of nonuse of a mineral royalty commences from the date on
which it is created.”232 “A mineral royalty is extinguished by: prescription
resulting from nonuse for ten years.”233
“Prescription of nonuse running against a mineral royalty is interrupted by the production of any mineral covered by the act creating the
royalty. Prescription is interrupted on the date on which actual production
begins and commences anew from the date of cessation of actual
production.”234
The jurisprudence rendered prior to the enactment of the Louisiana
Mineral Code reflects the application of these intrinsic tenets pertinent to
the mineral royalty.
In Union Sulphur Co., Inc. v. Lognion,235 the defendant conveyed a
royalty interest to Mr. Pitre by deed dated September 12, 1934. Through a
series of conveyances, a portion of this mineral royalty interest was
acquired by various parties, with Mr. Pitre retaining one-half (1/2) of the
acquired royalty. Mr. Pitre died on August 24, 1939, survived by his
widow and six children, only one of whom was a minor.
Operations for drilling on the land commenced August 8, 1944
(notably, within ten years of the date of creation of the royalty), and the
well was completed as a producer on October 5, 1944 (notably, beyond ten
years from the date of creation of the royalty).
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at § 31:86.
Id. at § 31:85(1).
Id. at § 31:87.
33 So. 2d 178 (La. 1947).
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The Court reaffirmed that the interest was a royalty interest and not a
servitude interest. Thus, prescription accrued on September 12, 1944,
since, prior to that date, no production had been secured. In view of the
passive nature of the royalty, “the date of the original royalty deed and that
of production were the determining factors respecting the issue of the
prescriptibility [sic] of his interest.”236
Expressly rejecting a contention that operations conducted prior to the
prescriptive date served to interrupt prescription accruing against the
mineral royalty, the Court said as follows:
If the interest acquired by Clarphy Pitre from the landowner had
been mineral rights (a servitude under our jurisprudence), the
matter of the commencement of drilling operations would be of
importance . . . . But since Clarphy Pitre’s interest was only a
mineral royalty (not a servitude), the doctrine relating to the
exercising or use of the rights is inapplicable, and the incident
referred to herein of commencing drilling operations is of no
moment.237
Since the mineral royalty is in the nature of a real charge or burden on
the land, the land or mineral servitude of which the royalty is an appendage
is simply relieved of the real charge or burden at extinction. As the
Louisiana Supreme Court said, the mineral royalty simply “passed out of
the picture,” and the “parties are in the same position as though no royalty
right had ever existed.”238
Another case, Union Oil Co. of California v. Touchet,239 was a
concursus proceeding that was instituted wherein the landowner and a
mineral royalty owner contested the ownership of the proceeds of a 1/32
mineral royalty.
The facts disclose that Mr. Touchet, the landowner, granted a 1/32
mineral royalty on March 6, 1940. Mr. Touchet’s mineral lease with Union,
as amended, contained a “Pooling Clause.” A well was completed for
production on the Thibodeaux tract “in the immediate vicinity of the
Touchet property.”240
On February 13, 1950, near the end of the ten-year prescriptive period
on the mineral royalty, Union filed a declaration creating a pooled unit
with adjacent land. On the now-unitized land, a unit well was completed
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 180.
Id.
Ark. Fuel Oil Co. v. Sanders, 69 So. 2d 745, 746 (La. 1954).
86 So. 2d 50 (La. 1956).
Id. at 52.
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and shut-in.241 Included in that unit were the lands of a Mr. Sonnier whose
lease (also owned by Union) did not have a “Pooling Clause,” as did Mr.
Touchet’s lease.
The question arose as to the interruption of prescription on the mineral
royalty interest. As stated by the Court, the issue was as follows:
Since the Louise Thibodeaux Well No. 1 was not located on the
lands subject to the royalty right, there was no production from
this tract and the royalty right here in dispute has prescribed for
want of production, unless the operating unit formed by means of
the declaration filed by the Union Oil Company on February 13,
1950, within 10 years of the date of the royalty sale, was valid;
for, if so, then the area comprising the unit is treated as one tract
and one lease, and production from any portion of the area making
up the operating unit has the same effect on property situated
within the unit as if the well was drilled and completed on each of
the various tracts of land embraced in the area and under each of
the leases. Accordingly, if the operating unit formed by the first
declaration filed by the oil company was valid and effective, the
royalty right has not prescribed.242
The Court held that the unit was not valid. The Court stated,
“Obviously the only meaning that this provision of the lease could have
was that the lessor granted to the lessee authority to combine his lease with
any other land or lease in the vicinity which the oil company also had
authority to unitize.”243
The lessee did not have the authority to pool the adjacent land and the
declared unit was not valid. To hold otherwise would mean that a lessee
could pool the leased premises with any other adjacent property, without
the power and authority of that adjacent landowner to do so, and thereby
extend the life of the mineral lease on the pooled leased premises. Since
the unit was invalid, prescription accruing against the mineral royalty
burdening the non-unitized tract was not interrupted.
In these circumstances, the net royalty payment to which a lessor is
entitled when a mineral royalty remains extant as a real charge or burden
on the lessor’s interest, is restored to a gross royalty payment when the

241. A “shut-in” well is one that is capable of producing gas, but that is not in
fact producing its gas, usually because of the lack of a market or marketing
facilities. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-13(a).
242. 86 So. 2d at 53.
243. Id. at 54.
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royalty interest “passes out of the picture,” at least insofar as the
entitlement to the fractional royalty interest is concerned.
4. “Estimated Acreage Clause”
The “Estimated Acreage Clause” in the mineral lease has no relevance
to this calculation.244 Such clause is provided for the protection and benefit
of the lessee in order that it might have confidence in the calculation of
delay rentals (and other payments based on delay rentals, such as “shut-in
payments” and “Pugh Clause” rentals). Because of the dire consequences
resulting from the failure to timely or properly pay such payments
(essentially, ipso facto lease termination),245 the lessee is given comfort in
making such payments that are calculated on the basis of acreage.
However, as royalties on unit production are based on a survey
prepared by a Registered Land Surveyor, the acreage stipulated by the
parties in this clause does not control for purposes of calculating royalties.
Thus, in Greene v. Carter Oil Co.,246 the court stated the following with
respect to the “Estimated Acreage Clause,” to-wit:
Where . . . the acreage of the leased premises is estimated, the
purpose is to foreclose uncertainty as to bonus, or rentals . . . . A
stipulation for estimated acreage is not forbidden by law and,
therefore, parties to a contract may bind themselves with respect
thereto, and this is true whether or not the estimated acreage
exceeds that actually owned.247
The court in the Greene case indicates that the clause does not apply
to the payment of royalties, which are to be based on actual acreage, by
survey, in case of unitized production. Thus, the court explained as such:
The primary question under consideration, however, is whether
royalties based upon estimated acreage as used in [the “Estimated
Acreage Clause”] are inclusive of royalties from production. Our
answer must be in the negative. “Acreage based royalty” or
“royalty based on acreage” as used in the lease has a distinct and
special status and application, and refers to per acre payments as

244.
245.
246.
247.

See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-20.
See id. at § 4-08(d)(4).
152 So. 2d 611 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied 153 So. 2d 414 (La. 1963).
Id. at 617-18.
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provided. The royalties payable from production may not be computed in such a manner.248
5. “Notice of Change of Ownership Clause”
If the lessor, after granting a mineral lease, sells the land with no
reservation of minerals, or if it sells an interest in the minerals in the leased
land by creating a mineral servitude, or grants a mineral royalty to a third
person, each of these transactions results in a change of ownership of the
rights to minerals when and if produced under the recorded mineral
lease.249 The lessee must be informed of these changes in order to modify
its “pay deck” so as to pay the proper party entitled to royalties under the
mineral lease.250 How does the lessee obtain the information necessary to
make these changes? Is it principally the burden or responsibility of the
lessee to ascertain these changes?
In order to relieve the lessee of the onerous burden of having to check
the “public records” continuously for the purpose of determining the party
entitled to receive royalties or other monies under the mineral lease, the
lease contract contains a “Notice of Change of Ownership Clause.” An
example of this important clause is the following, taken (in pertinent part)
from a commercial form of mineral lease in prevalent use in Louisiana:
All provisions hereof shall inure to the benefit of and bind the successors and assigns (in whole or in part) of Lessor and Lessee,
(whether by sale, inheritance, assignment, sub-lease or otherwise),
but regardless of any actual or constructive notice thereof, no
change in the ownership of the land or any interest therein or
change in the capacity or status of Lessor or any other owner of
rights hereunder, whether resulting from sale or other transfer,
inheritance, interdiction, emancipation, attainment of majority or
otherwise, shall impose any additional burden on Lessee, or be
binding on Lessee for making any payments hereunder unless, at
least forty-five (45) days before any such payment is due, the
record owner of this lease shall have been furnished with certified
copy of recorded instrument or judgment evidencing such sale,
transfer or inheritance, or with evidence of such change in status
248. Id. at 618.
249. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-27.
250. “The document seems to be a pay deck listing the royalty owners and
their addresses. . . . Pay decks are set up by [title] analysts to keep track of
ownership of oil and gas properties.” Weber v. Mobil Oil Corp., 243 P.3d 1, 4,
n.7 (Okla. 2010).
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or capacity of Lessor or other party owning rights hereunder. The
furnishing of such evidence shall not affect the validity of
payments theretofore made in advance. 251
Thus, it has been said that:
The very purpose of the provision of the lease relating to certified
copies of recorded instruments evidencing sales or assignments
affecting the leased property is to relieve a lessor of the
unreasonable burden of making constant examination of
Conveyance Records to see what changes of ownership have taken
place since the date of the lease.252
In Gulf Refining Co. v. Shatford,253 the court considered whether the
mineral lease had been maintained when the lessee paid delay rentals to a
prior owner (as reflected on the lessee’s records), where that owner’s
assignee failed to timely provide notice of the change in ownership to the
lessee in accordance with the “Notice of Change of Ownership Clause” in
the mineral lease. The court refused to penalize the lessee who paid rentals
based upon its own internal records, finding that the transferee was not
diligent in providing notice of the change in ownership. The court further
explained as follows:
To now permit Shatford to cancel the lease so far as it affects his
one-eight interest would be to reward him for his negligence and
punish Gulf for living up to its contract. The rental money had
been sent to the lessors’ agent bank prior to the time Gulf received
copies of Shatford’s deeds. Shatford should not now look to Gulf
for his portion of that rental money; he should look to those
persons who received it-the persons from whom he secured his
interest.254
In Atlantic Refining Co. v. Shell Oil Co.,255 plaintiff-assignee of
mineral lease brought an action to declare null a mineral lease executed
subsequent to plaintiff’s lease by plaintiff’s lessor and to declare the
validity of the mineral lease under which plaintiff operated. Judgment was
rendered for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed. The Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Paragraph 9, Bath 6 Form.
Pearce v. S. Nat. Gas Co., 58 So. 2d 396, 398 (La. 1952).
159 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1947).
Id. at 233.
46 So. 2d 907 (La. 1950).
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After executing the mineral lease, the lessor sold one-half (1/2) of the
minerals to a third party. In that sale, the parties agreed that the transferee
was not to participate in the delay rentals that might be paid under the
mineral lease. In order to evidence that intention, certain words and
provisions of the printed form to the contrary were stricken out, so that the
printed form appeared, “Conveys unto Grantee One Half (1/2) of all of the
royalties, rentals and other benefits, including money rentals payable for
drilling operations, accruing under any valid oil, gas or mineral lease or
servitude on said property which has heretofore been filed for record.”256
That mineral sale was recorded, but a certified copy of the deed was
not provided to the lessee. The mineral lease contained a “Notice of
Change of Ownership Clause” providing that a change in ownership was
not to be binding on lessee or impair the effectiveness of any payments
made until the lessee “shall have been furnished, forty-five days before
payment is due, a certified copy of recorded instrument evidencing any
transfer.”257
The plaintiff obtained a title opinion that correctly reflected the sale.
Based upon that sale as disclosed by the title opinion, the plaintiff tendered
one-half (1/2) of the delay rentals to the original lessor and one-half (1/2)
to the lessor’s transferee.258
When the lessor refused to accept the delay rentals, the plaintiff
contended that it was entitled to rely upon the public records which
reflected the sale of one-half (1/2) of the minerals to a third party.259 The
Court rejected this contention, saying:
The fallacy of this conclusion lies, we think, in the fact that the
plaintiff had no occasion to rely on the public records or to
construe the contract, as no certified copy of the recorded deed
evidencing the transfer of mineral interest from Furlow to Shell
was delivered to plaintiff and it was not required to interpret the
intention of the parties or to act in reference thereto . . . .260
The Court held that the delay rentals were not paid timely or properly, and
thus, the mineral lease lapsed by its own terms. Consequently, the
defendant’s mineral lease was the valid lease.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 908.
Id.
Id. at 909.
Id.
Id.
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In yet another case,261 after a mineral lease was granted, the plaintiff
acquired an undivided one-eighth (1/8) mineral interest in the subject tract
of land, later disposing of an undivided one-sixteenth (1/16) interest. The
lessee did not receive a certified copy of this mineral deed.
The mineral lease provided that no “change in ownership shall be
binding on lessee nor impair the effectiveness of any payments made
hereunder until lessee shall have been furnished, forty-five (45) days
before payment is due, a certified copy of recorded instrument evidencing
any transfer, inheritance, sale, or other change in ownership * * *.”262
The lessee, not having been provided a “certified copy of recorded
instrument evidencing any transfer, inheritance, sale, or other change in
ownership,” paid delay rentals to the original lessors, rather than to the
plaintiff. Plaintiff contended that the lessee had knowledge of the sale to
plaintiff by virtue of an abstract of title that contained the instrument.
The court rejected plaintiff’s contention, relying on Pearce v.
Southern Natural Gas Co.263 and Atlantic Refining Co. v. Shell Oil Co.264
The court observed as follows:
The opinion of the court in the Pearce case, relying upon the
Atlantic Refining Company case, specifically declared (1) that a
lessee is not required to take notice of public records which might
show a transfer or assignment by lessor, and (2) that the very
purpose of a lease provision relating to furnishing certified copies
is intended to relieve the unreasonable burden of making “* * *
constant examination of Conveyance Records to see what changes
of ownership have taken place since the date of the lease.”265
In Hibbert v. Mudd,266 a case involving the payment of royalties (rather
than delay rentals), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that lease provisions
of this type “are solely for the lessee’s benefit to relieve him of the
unreasonable burden of constantly checking the public records for changes
in ownership which may have occurred.”267 The Court further stated:
Our interpretation of this lease provision is that the lessee is
protected under the provision not only as to the effectiveness of
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Garelick v. Sw. Gas Producing Co., 129 So. 2d 520 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
Id. at 521.
58 So. 2d 396.
46 So. 2d 907.
Garelick, 129 So. 2d at 522.
294 So. 2d 518 (La. 1974).
Id. at 523.
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payments made without the benefit of certified evidence of an
ownership change, he is also protected against the imposition of
any additional burdens resulting from such an ownership change
until he receives certified evidence.268
In Lapeze v. Amoco Production Co.,269 the court stated the proposition
as follows:
The inescapable fact is that defendant was compelled to make the
payment in conformity with the specific provision of the 1976
lease. They were forbidden by the lease from taking a successors’
[sic] word as to his successorship for purposes of payment (Par.
9: “regardless of any actual or constructive notice”). It has been
generally accepted that the lessee’s better course in such ‘catch
22’ situations is to comply with the literal terms of the lease,
regardless of the lessee’s actual or constructive knowledge, and to
direct payment to the original lessor until the stipulated evidence
of change of ownership is furnished. “The lessee is protected when
he relies on failure to furnish proof of change of ownership, but is
not protected when he relies on anything else.”270
Moreover, “[t]he provisions of the change of ownership clause are
usually strictly construed with the result that there must be a literal rather
than a mere substantial compliance with the provisions for giving notice
of change of ownership.”271
The lessee’s strict compliance with the “Notice of Change of Ownership
Clause” is important because, as explained by the Commentator:
If the lease contains a change in ownership clause but no notice is
given under such clause, a change in ownership of the lessor’s
interest is no excuse for the lessee’s failure to pay delay rentals to
the former owner of the lessor’s interest, and if the lessee relies on
the public records and makes payments to persons the lessee
believes to be the new owners, such payments are made at the
lessee’s own peril.272

268.
269.
270.
271.
(2011).
272.

Id.
842 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 135 (citations omitted).
3 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 37.9
Id.
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Similarly, another treatise states the following, to-wit:
Absent receipt of notice in the manner required by the notice
provisions of the assignment clause, the lessee or his assignee acts
at his peril in paying rentals other than as provided for by the delay
rental clause. Failure of the assignee to give the lessee notice of a
transfer may, or may not excuse the lessee’s failure to make a
timely tender of delay rental payments. Likewise, failure of the
assignee to give the lessee notice of a transfer will not excuse the
lessee from liability for breach of express or implied lease
covenants.273
The clause is for the protection of the lessee inasmuch as a lessee who
relies on its provisions is immunized from responsibility if it pays the party
shown by its records to be due and entitled to the payments under the
mineral lease. The clause places the burden on the lessor or its successor
to notify the lessee in a timely and proper manner so that the records can
be adjusted to account for the change in ownership resulting from the
transfer of the lessor’s interest. If the lessee ignores the “safe-harbor”
protection of the clause, it does so at its own risk.274
Admittedly, most of the cases that consider the “Notice of Change of
Ownership Clause” of a mineral lease and non-compliance with the notice
requirements of this important provision have been concerned with the
payment of delay rentals under the lease, rather than of royalties. Many
clauses have application to “payments made to Lessor herein named,” or
“payments hereunder,” without distinction as to type or character of

273. MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 60, at 4.
274. See, e.g., 46 So. 2d at 910 (“Thus it may be seen that the plaintiff was not
acting on the record . . . but acted at its own peril in choosing an insecure method
without further inquiry, when it was protected by its own contract; and
furthermore, made no effort to straighten out its difficulties with Furlow, the real
party in interest.”); Hibbert, 294 So. 2d at 523 (“Our interpretation of this lease
provision is that the lessee is protected under the provision not only as to the
effectiveness of payments made without benefit of certified evidence of an
ownership change, he is also protected against the imposition of any additional
burdens resulting from such an ownership change until he receives certified
evidence.”); Hanks v. Wilson, 633 So. 2d 1345, 1350 (La. Ct. App. 1994)
(“Obviously, the purpose of a clause such as Paragraph 9 is to protect the lessee
against the possibility of losing a lease by reason of failure to pay rentals, royalties
or other payments to the person entitled thereto after a change in the ownership of
the land or interest therein of any person previously entitled to receive such
payment.”).
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payment, while some clauses explicitly make reference to royalty
payments as well as delay rentals.
Certainly, the circumstance of an improper payment of delay rentals
is significantly more consequential than an improper payment of royalties
since, in the former case, the mineral lease would otherwise automatically
terminate with no opportunity to cure or rectify any incorrect payment,275
while in the latter, the provisions of the Mineral Code require written
notice of non-payment with an opportunity for the lessee to investigate and
rectify any error in payment.276
E. Royalty Interest Stated in Mineral Lease
1. The “Royalty Clause” of the Mineral Lease
If any proof is needed that the calculation of a lessor’s royalty payment
involves “much more than mere math,” one might note that it has taken
sixty-seven pages to get to the “heart of the matter”—the lease’s “Royalty
Clause.”
The logical starting point to calculate the royalty payment to which a
lessor is entitled is the mineral lease itself. In the “Royalty Clause” of the
mineral lease, the parties set forth the lessor’s royalty share of production,
often stated as a fraction, but the royalty might also be expressed as a
decimal or percentage. The royalty is stated in the mineral lease on a “gross
basis,” but it might be subject to reduction.277
Regardless, it is essential that the mineral lease properly express the
intentions of the parties with respect to the royalty share to which they
have agreed. If this seems self-evident, consider the facts and
circumstances presented in the following case.
In Adams v. JPD Energy, Inc.,278 the court found a mineral lease null
and void where there was no “meeting of the minds” as to essential terms,
viz., the royalty to which the parties agreed.
The plaintiffs signed a mineral lease providing for a one-eighth (1/8)
royalty; the printed royalty fraction in the commercial lease form was not
modified to reflect any different royalty.
Later, the plaintiffs sued for dissolution of the lease, alleging that the
parties had agreed to a twenty-five percent royalty during the negotiations.

275.
276.
277.
278.

See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-08(d)(4).
See id. at § 13-29.
See supra Part II.D.2. See also id. at § 4-30.
46 So. 3d 751 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied 49 So. 3d 892 (La. 2010).

68

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. VI

The lessee responded that the parties had agreed to a twenty percent
royalty, and the mineral lease should be reformed to reflect such royalty.279
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the plaintiff
seeking cancellation based upon the absence of a “meeting of the minds”
and the defendant-lessee seeking reformation to reflect a royalty based upon
twenty percent. According to the appellate court, the trial court resolved the
cross-motions as follows:
Following a hearing, the district court denied JPD’s motion for
summary judgment, granted plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary
judgment and entered a judgment declaring the mineral lease “null,
void and cancelled.” The court noted that the lease agreement stated
that the amount of royalties would be one-eighth of production;
Adams testified that he was under the impression that the royalties
would be one-fourth of production; and JPD stated that the royalty
provision should have stated one-fifth of production. Therefore, the
court concluded that the lease was null because there was no
“meeting of the minds as far as what the royalties were going to
be.”280
In ruling for the plaintiff, the district court stated:
I do find that there is definitely a question of fact as to what the
royalty should be. The plaintiff indicates, as I have repeated time
and time again, that he was under the impression that the royalties
were going to be 25 percent. The Defendants were under the
impression that the royalty would be 20 percent. The lease
agreement itself says one-eighth. Therefore, we do not have a
meeting of the minds as far as what the royalties were going to be.
*

*

*

Regardless of whether he signed it without reading or whether he
read it, there is still no meeting of the minds as to royalties.281

279. “Reformation of a contract is an equitable remedy available to a
contracting party if the instrument recites terms to which neither party agreed.
Even if the language utilized is clear and unambiguous, parol evidence is
admissible to establish that the language does not embody the essence of the
agreement to which there was mutual assent.” Valhi, Inc. v. Zapata Corp., 365 So.
2d 867, 870 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
280. 46 So. 3d at 754.
281. Id. at 755.
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On appeal, the appellate court affirmed, and summarized its ruling as
follows:
JPD concedes that the amount of royalties stated in the written lease
was incorrect. Thus, whether Adams read the lease before signing
it is of no moment. As stated above, the written lease provided that
the amount of royalties would be one-eighth of production. JPD
contends that the lease should have stated that the amount of
royalties would be one-fifth (20%) of production, while Adams
testified that he and Pierce agreed that the royalty percentage
would be one-fourth (25%) of production. Therefore, based upon
this record, we find that there was no “meeting of the minds” or
mutual consent between the parties with regard to the amount of
royalties. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s
finding that the mineral lease was null.282
2. Role of Division Orders283
While the mineral lease itself is the genesis of the pertinent royalty
interest to which the lessor is entitled, it is not uncommon for the lessee or
other payor of production proceeds to seek a “division order” from the
lessee.
A division order is “an instrument setting forth the proportional
ownership in oil or gas, or the value thereof, which division order is prepared
after examination of title and which is executed by the owners of the
production or other persons having authority to act on behalf of the owners
thereof.”284
While of benefit to the lessee, its role is limited by the Mineral Code.
Thus, a “division order may not alter or amend the terms of the oil and gas
lease. A division order that varies the terms of the oil and gas lease is
invalid to the extent of the variance, and the terms of the oil and gas lease
take precedence.”285
Similarly, the Mineral Code stipulates that the “execution of a division
order is not a condition precedent to receiving payment from a lessee. The

282. Id. at 756.
283. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at §§ 3-30, 1-26(k).
284. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:138.1A (1992). See also OTTINGER, MINERAL
LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 1-26(k).
285. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:138.1B (1992).

70

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. VI

lessee shall not withhold royalty payments because his lessor has not
executed a division order.”286
A lessee will typically seek to obtain a division order in the event of
unitization, or if there are fractional interests or co-owned interests
involved. These circumstances often give rise to uncertainty, even
confusion, and the lessee seeking to secure a division order is desirous of
obtaining comfort that its calculations are approved by the lessor or other
person entitled to royalty.
The myriad of factors and considerations involved in reaching the
amount of a gross royalty payment are necessary to be considered. The
next step is to discern if that gross number is to be diminished so as to
determine the net amount due to the lessor.
III. THE FACTORS AND CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN THE
CALCULATION OF THE NET ROYALTY PAYMENT
A. Preface
The discussion above was directed to the calculation of the gross royalty
payment to which a lessor might be entitled. From this gross number,
determined as it is by “mere math,” there are certain factors or considerations
that might constitute or give rise to deductions from that amount, thereby
reducing the gross royalty to the net royalty payment ultimately reflected in
the lessor’s royalty check.
B. “Post-Production Costs”287
A tome could be written on this important topic. Particularly in the
“shale plays,”288 it has engendered a spate of litigation, including class
actions, in which lessors challenge the methodology of lessees in passing
along to its lessors a portion of costs incurred in the treatment, processing,
or handling of production (principally natural gas) after it departs the well
head and moves “downstream.” Louisiana subscribes to the rule that,
286. Id. at § 31:138.1C. The article codifies the jurisprudential rule to the same
effect. See Fontenot v. Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co., 197 So. 2d 715 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied 199 So. 2d 915 (La. 1967).
287. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at §§ 4-25(d)(6),
5-14.
288. The term “shale plays” has reference to the areas in which operators
engage in “unconventional drilling” by employing techniques of hydraulic
fracturing, or “fracking.” In Louisiana, the Haynesville Shale in northwestern
Louisiana is a principal example.
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unless the mineral lease provides to the contrary, the lessee may assess a
proportionate part of “post-production costs” against the interest of the
lessor.289
Notably, there is no statement in Louisiana Mineral Code article
213(5) about the fact that the lessor’s royalty is to be free of costs.
However, courts have made reference, by way of analogy, to Louisiana
Mineral Code article 80, which addresses the mineral royalty. That article
provides that “[u]nless expressly qualified by the parties, a royalty is a
right to share in gross production free of mining or drilling and production
costs.”290
As discussed in Part I.D.1 hereof, the lessee is required to accompany
the royalty check with a check stub. A review of article 212.31 of the
Louisiana Mineral Code indicates that there is no requirement that the
check stub identify any deductions for “post-production costs.”291
Rather, the only references in that article to the deductions that must
be disclosed by the lessee in the check stub are to “tax deductions.” Hence,
there is no automatic mechanism by which the lessor might be informed
of the fact that the lessee has imposed deductions for “post-production
costs,” or the extent or quantification thereof. This absence of any positive
requirement of disclosure certainly leads to the possibility that a variance
might exist in the amount shown on the check stub and the accompanying
royalty check, unless the lessee supplements the statutorily required
information with data pertinent to such deductions. The lessee would be
prudent to explain any such differential.
C. Severance Taxes292
The Louisiana Constitution authorizes severance taxes to be assessed
“at the time and place of severance,”293 and such taxes are imposed by
statute. They are assessed against oil and gas and other natural resources.294
289. Merritt v. Southwestern Electric Power Co., 499 So. 2d 210 (La. Ct. App.
1986).
290. See, e.g., Culpepper v. EOG Resources, Inc., 92 So. 3d 1141, 1143 (La.
Ct. App.), writ denied 98 So. 3d 870 (La. 2012).
291. In contrast, the Texas check stub statute requires, among other
information, the disclosure of “any other deductions or adjustments.” TEX. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. § 91.502(7) (West 2002).
292. For a thorough examination of the law pertaining to severance taxes, see
Robert S. Angelico, State and Local Taxes: Current Issues in the Louisiana
Severance Tax on Crude Oil and Condensate, 64 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. _ (2017).
293. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 4(B).
294. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:631 (1997).
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These taxes are paid by the owner at the time of severance and are payable
monthly.295 Unless in an exceptional category, severance taxes on oil are
based upon 12 1/2% of the “value at the time and place of severance,”296
less charges for trucking, barging, and pipeline fees. Severance taxes on
natural gas are based upon a base tax of ten cents per thousand cubic feet.297
The rate on natural gas, however, is adjusted annually according to a defined
“gas base rate adjustment” procedure, “but shall never be less than seven
cents per thousand cubic feet.”298
Reduced rates apply to an “incapable” well299 and to a “stripper”
well,300 but application for the reduction must be timely made in advance,
not after the commencement of production.301
An “incapable” well is a well that is incapable of producing an average
of more than twenty-five barrels of oil per producing day during the entire
taxable month, and which also produces at least fifty percent salt water per
day.302 The eligibility of such a well is a matter to be determined by relevant
state regulatory authorities.
A “stripper” well is an oil well that is “certified by the Department of
Revenue that such well is incapable of producing an average of more than
ten barrels of oil per producing day during the entire taxable month.”303
Certain categories of gas are exempt from severance taxes. Illustrative
of these exemptions are the following seven categories of gas:
(a) Gas injected “for the purpose of storing by the producer.” Because
this gas will eventually be “severed from the earth” (at which time
the tax will be paid), this is really more of a deferred payment than
an exemption.304
(b) Gas produced in another state, transported into Louisiana, and
injected for the purpose of storing by the producer.305

295. Id. at § 47:632A.
296. Id. at § 47:633(7)(a).
297. Id. at § 47:633(9)(a).
298. Id. at § 47:633(9)(d)(i).
299. Id. at § 47:633(7)(b).
300. Id. at § 47:633(7)(c)(i)(aa).
301. See McNamara v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 589 So. 2d 1099 (La. Ct. App.
1991), writ denied 592 So. 2d 1335 (La. 1992).
302. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:633(7)(b) (2015).
303. Id. at § 47:633(7)(c)(i)(aa).
304. Id. at § 47:633(9)(e)(i).
305. Id. at § 47:633(9)(e)(ii).
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(c) Gas produced from “oil wells and vented or flared directly into
the atmosphere, provided such gas is not otherwise sold.”306
(d) Gas used or consumed in maintaining the operation of a field,
including heating, separating, producing, dehydrating, compressing,
and pumping of oil and gas in the field where produced, provided
such gas is not otherwise sold.307
(e) Gas consumed in the production of natural resources in this
State.308
(f) Gas produced from “gas wells and vented or flared directly into
the atmosphere, provided such gas is not otherwise sold.”309
(g) Gas used in the manufacture of carbon black.310
Additionally, Louisiana has implemented a program that suspends
severance taxes for certain periods of time with respect to horizontally
drilled wells,311 inactive wells,312 deep wells,313 and “on distillate,
condensate, or similar natural resources severed from the soil or water either
with oil or gas.”314 The Louisiana Office of Conservation determines the
eligibility of these wells.
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:633(7)(a) allows a deduction
for “charges for trucking, barging and pipeline fees,” but the administration
of this deduction has been subject to contradictory interpretations by the
Secretary of the Department of Revenue.
The severance taxes are borne proportionally between the lessor and
the lessee,315 unless the mineral lease provides otherwise. While rare, there
is authority for the parties to contractually shift the lessor’s in rem
responsibility for severance taxes to the lessee.

306. Id. at § 47:633(9)(e)(iii).
307. Id. at § 47:633(9)(e)(iv).
308. Id. at § 47:633(9)(e)(v).
309. Id. at § 47:633(9)(e)(vi).
310. Id. at § 47:633(9)(e)(vii).
311. Id. at § 47:633(7)(c)(ii).
312. Id. at § 47:633(7)(c)(iv). However, the suspension ended on June 30, 2010.
313. Id. at § 47:633(9)(d)(v). These are wells drilled to a true vertical depth of
more than 15,000 feet subsurface.
314. Id. at § 47:633(8).
315. Id. at § 47:632A.
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Thus, in Everett v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,316 the mineral lease in
question obligated the lessee to pay to the lessor a bonus equal to:
one-eighth (1/8) of the lessee’s seven-eighths (7/8) working
interest oil first produced and saved from the well or wells . . .
until there shall have been produced and saved to the credit of
said fractional part of the oil the market value of Fifteen Thousand
Dollars ($15,000.00) at the current market price at the time of
production . . . .317
The lessee paid to the lessor, pursuant to this clause, the stipulated
bonus, but deducted $1,382.34 as the severance tax pertaining to such
production. The lessor filed suit for the deducted amount. The Louisiana
Supreme Court stated:
Thus, this language denotes that plaintiffs are to be paid in oil
having a market value of $15,000-not less the severance taxbecause the oil, burdened with the severance tax, would not have
a market value of $15,000. Since the severance tax had to be paid
at the time the oil was taken from the land, oil having a market
value of $15,000 means oil that can be sold on the market for that
price, obviously not oil upon which a severance tax is due.318
Severance taxes are an essential source of revenue to the State of
Louisiana, and correspondingly, a factor that diminishes the royalty to
which the lessor is entitled. Exemptions and other suspensions of the tax
also need to be considered in calculating the lessor’s royalty payment.
IV. THE EFFECT OF UNITIZATION
As stated previously,319 if a well is drilled on a “lease basis” without
unitization, there is no need to reduce or diminish the royalty stream
further. In such a case, the lessee owns the entirety (100%) of production,
subject to the workings of the “Royalty Clause.” If the leased land is
unitized, however, another factor or consideration is introduced to the
formula by which the royalty is to be calculated.

316.
317.
318.
319.

51 So. 2d 87 (La. 1951).
Id. at 95.
Id.
See supra Part III.B.

2017]

CALCULATING THE LESSOR’S ROYALTY PAYMENT

75

A. Types of Units
It is often said that there are three types of units: “compulsory,”320
“voluntary,” and “declared.” It is more accurate to say that there are two
types of units: “compulsory” and “conventional.”
A compulsory unit is “a unit formed by order of a governmental
agency.”321 There are five kinds of compulsory units.322
A conventional unit is formed by contract without intervention by the
Commissioner of Conservation and might be of two kinds–either a
declared unit or a voluntary (contractual) unit.323 Typically, the instrument
establishing either type of conventional unit contains a plat of survey that
sets forth the tract’s participation on a surface acreage basis.
B. Basis of Allocation of Unitized Production to Royalty Owners
The preliminary inquiry is to identify the basis on which unit
production is to be allocated to a royalty owner in a unitized tract. Two
principal methodologies are recognized nationally, viz., the “weighted
average approach” and the “tract allocation approach.”
As determined by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in a case based upon
an interpretation of the Oklahoma pooling statute,324 one commentator
explained that, under the “weighted average method,” “[e]ach royalty
owner was to share in 1/8th of production from the well in proportion that
their acreage bore to the entire acreage of the unit.”325
Prevailing in Louisiana is the “tract allocation method.” Under this
approach, each royalty owner in the unit is “entitled to be paid from the
proceeds realized from the share of the production of this well allocated to
320. Compulsory units may also be called “forced,” “governmental,” or
“Commissioner’s” units.
321. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213(6) (1983).
322. These are a “drilling and production” unit (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:9
(2015)); a “fieldwide” or “reservoirwide” unit (sometimes called a “441 unit,”
being a reference to Act No. 441 of 1960) (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5C (1992));
a “deep pool” unit (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5.1A (2012)); an “ultra deep
structure” unit (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5.1B (2012)); and a “coal seam natural
gas producing” unit (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5.2 (2004)).
323. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Conventional Unitization in Louisiana, 49 ANN.
INST. ON MIN. L. 21, 24, 26-27 (2002) [hereinafter Ottinger, Conventional
Unitization].
324. Shell Oil Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 389 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1963).
325. Bruce M. Kramer, Royalty Interest in the United States: Not Cut From
the Same Cloth, 29 TULSA L.J. 449, 478 (1994).
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the tracts in which they have an interest, as specifically provided in their
individual contracts.”326 In subscribing to this position, the Louisiana
Supreme Court announced the “proposition that private contractual rights
in these leases are only superseded when they are in conflict with the valid
orders of the Commissioner of Conservation, i.e., when the order is a
conservation measure, pure and simple.”327
If all mineral leases within a unit provide for the identical royalty to
each lessor, and if there are either no burdens, or all burdens are
consistently spread across the unit, then the royalty mix is homogenous or
identical, and allocation under either method results in the same net result
to each lessor, subject to any proportionate reduction.
C. Basis of Participation in Unitized Production
Having established that Louisiana subscribes to the “tract allocation
approach,” the next relevant inquiry is the basis of participation in a
compulsory unit. Most units established by the Office of Conservation
require a surface acreage basis of participation, meaning that a given
unitized tract will be allocated that proportion of the entirety of unit
production as its participating acreage bears to all acreage in the unit.
Another basis, albeit infrequently used, is the “acre-foot” basis of
participation.328 In these instances, the operator makes a calculation as to
the volumetric configuration of the unitized reservoir so that the
volumetric content underlying a particular tract is determined. That tract
is then allocated the volume of the stratum underlying its surface area,
determined by multiplying the surface area in acres by the thickness of the
underlying stratum in feet.329
One case described the “acre-foot” method as a method “whereby the
net sand content under each tract of land was determined, and an estimate
made of all hydrocarbons in place to determine the value of the ultimate
production to be obtained from each tract of land.”330
326. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest Natural Production Co., 60 So.
2d 9, 11 (La. 1952).
327. Id. at 10.
328. This basis of sharing of unit production is most often involved in
“reservoirwide units,” as authorized by LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5C (1992). See
Eads, 646 So. 2d 948. In the interest of full disclosure, your author represented
the operator in this suit.
329. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Gill, 194 So. 2d 351, 353 (La. Ct. App. 1966), writ
refused 194 So. 2d 738 (La. 1967).
330. Texaco, Inc. v. Vermilion Parish School Bd., 145 So. 2d 383, 385 (La.
Ct. App. 1962), rev’d in part, undisturbed in part 152 So. 2d 541 (La. 1963).
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D. Calculation of Proportionate Share of Unitized Production
If the lessor’s land is unitized, the interest of the lessor will be
diminished proportionately to the land’s participation in the unit,
regardless of the basis of participation. An exception to this statement is
the situation in which the lessor’s land composes the entirety of the lands
included within the unit. In that event, there being no extraneous, “thirdparty” land contained in the unit, the entirety of production is allocable to
the lessor. This is to the same effect as though the well was a “lease basis”
well.331
By way of example, however, if the lessor owns twenty acres under
lease, and the entirety of those leased lands are situated within a 120-acre
unit, the lessor’s royalty will constitute its royalty share of 20/120 of the
entirety (8/8) of unit production, or 1/6, or .1666667 of the total unit
production.
If, rather than all of the leased land being included within the unit, only
13.124 acres of the twenty-acre tract are contained in that unit, then the
lessor of that tract will receive its royalty share of 13.124/120 acres.332 The
balance of 6.876 acres under lease are outside of the unit, or non-unitized,
and do not share in unit production since a unit is defined as “the maximum
area which may be efficiently and economically drained by the well or
wells designated to serve the drilling unit as the unit well, substitute unit
well, or alternate unit well.”333
These illustrations serve to remind one that the unitization of lands
creates another level of considerations in the calculation of the lessor’s
royalty payment.
E. Freezing Effect334
Some courts have considered whether a conventional unit is
terminated by reason of the subsequent formation of a compulsory unit for
the same well. The conclusions differ according to the kind of conventional
unit involved.

331. See Will-Drill Resources, Inc. v. Huggs Inc., 738 So. 2d 1196, 1200 (La.
Ct. App.), writ denied 751 So. 2d 885 (La. 1999) (“If, . . ., the unit is comprised
entirely of the leased premises, . . ., the consequences to the landowner-lessor are
the same as if the well were a lease well.”).
332. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 11-08.
333. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:9B (2015).
334. Portions of this section are an adaptation of material contained in
Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 323.
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1. Declared Unit
A declared unit is an appendage or creature of the leases to which it
relates.335 Consequently, when the unitized leases expire, so does the
unit.336
A declared unit is terminated by the subsequent creation of a
compulsory unit, at least in the absence of a contrary intention in the
“Pooling Clause.”337 In Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Jones,338 the lessee
contended that, despite the formation of the compulsory unit for the same
well for which the declared unit was previously created, the declared unit
effected a freezing of participation, so that a party who was in the original
declared unit, but who was excluded from the compulsory unit, would
nonetheless continue to participate through the freezing relationship. In a
prior opinion, the court did not agree, stating, “In the case at bar, the
Commissioner has found the true participations. When this is done, the
parties should not be presumed to have agreed to share their interest on the
old declared unit unless they show a specific and positive intention to
freeze the old unit.”339
The case turned on the fact that the mineral lease containing the “pooling
power”340 did not evidence any intention to freeze the participations in the
event a compulsory unit was subsequently created.341 Because the validity
and continued efficacy of a declared unit is to be determined by the language
335. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:126 (1975) (“An interest created out of the
mineral lessee’s interest is dependent on the continued existence of the lease . . . .”).
336. Texaco, Inc. v. Letterman, 343 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo
1961) (“With two of the three leases making up the . . . unit terminating by their
own terms, we fail to see how the unit could survive. A unitized unit is wholly
dependent upon existing mineral leases.”).
337. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-21.
338. 157 So. 2d 110 (La. Ct. App. 1963), aff’g original decision in 125 So. 2d
640 (La. Ct. App. 1960), writ refused 159 So. 2d 284 (La. 1963).
339. 125 So. 2d at 646 (emphasis added).
340. A lessee enjoys “pooling power” if the lease contains a “Pooling Clause,”
which is a lease provision that explicitly empowers the lessee, without the further
consent or joinder of the lessor, to create a “pooled unit” merely by executing and
filing a “declaration of unit” which describes the unit. Because it is a “creature of
contract,” the “declared unit” must strictly abide the requirements and limitations of
such clause. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-21(a).
341. 157 So. 2d 110. Actually, there was disagreement as among the appellate
judges as to whether the unit under consideration was a “declared” unit or a
“voluntary” unit. The majority characterized it as a “declared” unit and the case
was determined accordingly. Judge Tate dissented, viewing it as a “voluntary”
unit.
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of the “Pooling Clause,” the requisite intention to continue the declared
unit must reside in that provision, rather than in the lessee’s declaration of
unit.342 This notion is consistent with the principle that an assignee
acquires no greater rights than its assignor has granted it.343
2. Voluntary Unit
As discussed above, courts have held, in reference to declared units,
that “the parties [originally affected by a declared unit] should not be
presumed to have agreed to share their interest on the old declared unit
unless they show a specific and positive intention to freeze the old unit.”344
A converse presumption applies to voluntary units.
In Texaco, Inc. v. Vermilion Parish School Board,345 the court recognized:
Voluntary units, formed through a complete agreement signed by
all lessors and lessees, should Not be subject to change by the
Conservation Commissioner’s order Unless the parties have
expressly stipulated for this change in the agreement. Here it is
presumed that the parties intended to freeze their rights because
all of the parties participated in the confection of the voluntary
unit agreement, and where they agreed on certain fixed interests
and did not contract to have them changed, their contract should
be the law of the contract.346
Under these circumstances, the unitized portion of the voluntary unit
becomes, in effect, a “unit within a unit” such that all parties to the voluntary
unit share production allocable to the portion unitized in the compulsory unit
on the same basis as was shared in the original voluntary unit.
In order to negate any intention to “freeze” their interests, it is
common for a voluntary unit agreement to contain an “Express Dissolution
Clause”347—often called a “Self-destruct Clause”—such as the following:
If a unit for the Unit Well is created and established by the
342. “It does not appear to this Court that the lessor could be said to have
frozen his royalty interests in the voluntary unit unless he so declared in the lease
agreement.” 125 So. 2d at 647 (emphasis added).
343. See Herlitz Constr. Co., Inc. v. Matherne, 476 So. 2d 1037 (La. Ct. App.
1985). See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 2-09.
344. 125 So. 2d at 646.
345. 145 So. 2d 383.
346. Id. at 394 (Savoy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
347. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2017 (2017).
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Commissioner of Conservation by formal order after public
hearing, such unit shall supersede and entirely replace the unit
hereby created and established as to the sand so unitized by the
Commissioner of Conservation as of the effective date of such
order. Except as is provided in the preceding sentence, this Unit
Agreement and the Pooled Unit created and established hereby
shall ipso facto terminate at such time as all of Said Leases
terminate insofar as they cover and affect land and property within
the Pooled Unit.
As has been demonstrated, the process of unitization can play a
significant role in the determination of the royalties to which the unitized
royalty owner is entitled. As next shown, other factors or considerations
might result in further adjustment of the net royalty owed to the lessor or
other royalty owner.
V. OTHER FACTORS OR CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING
THE AMOUNT OF THE ROYALTY PAYMENT
A. Preface
It sometimes happens that the lessee will have occasion to withhold
amounts of money from the net royalty payment to which the lessor is
otherwise entitled. As noted herein, the reason for the withholding might
be contractually authorized (enforcing an express contractual right in the
mineral lease); legally permitted (reimbursement to the lessee of an
overpayment); or legally required (withholding Federal income taxes
pursuant to Federal law).
Because these causes for royalty-reduction are not to be effectuated
on a proportionate basis, tethered to quantities or values of production
(rather, in most instances, it involves the enforcement of a credit in a hard,
distinct dollar amount), these causes are considered herein, and not in Part
III hereof relative to the factors or considerations that are involved in the
calculation of the lessor’s net royalty payment. Factors or considerations
of the latter character are based upon quantities or values of production.
The causes here under examination are not “deductions,” properly
speaking, but are withholdings that are legally authorized, if not required.
B. Subrogation of Taxes and Privileges Discharged by Lessee
The “Warranty Clause” in the Bath 6 Form reads, in part:348
348. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 4-29.
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Lessor hereby warrants and agrees to defend the title to said land
and agrees that Lessee may, at its option, discharge any tax,
mortgage or other lien upon the land and be subrogated thereto
and have the right to apply to the repayment of Lessee any rentals
and/or royalties accruing hereunder.
Although the lessee will rarely invoke this provision, it does provide
authority to the lessee to reduce future royalties in order to reimburse itself
for any payment made by it on behalf of its lessor to “discharge any tax,
mortgage or other lien.”349 This clause gives rise to a sort of conventional
subrogation.350
Typically, the lessee would only have occasion to invoke this
provision if the lessor has granted a mortgage on the leased lands, which
has not been subordinated to the mineral lease burdening the mortgaged
land. Only in that circumstance is the lessee exposed to the possibility that
the lessor’s mortgage will be enforced, with the result that the lessee’s
mineral lease might be displaced by a judicial sale.351
The court in Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans vs.
Hibernia National Bank in New Orleans,352 stated it this way:
The fact that a proprietor has placed a mortgage upon his property
does not prohibit him from making a lease of the property, which
lease, however, would be subject to the mortgage. But the sale of
349. Properly speaking, Louisiana law does not recognize the institution of
“lien;” rather, in the civil law, it is denominated as “privilege.” As the Fifth Circuit
has stated, “[t]he common law term ‘lien’ and civil law term ‘privilege’ will be
used interchangeably throughout this opinion because the parties spoke of the
terms as equivalent and as the differences between the terms are not relevant to
our analysis.” Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Engineers, Inc., 395 F.3d 533,
536, n.3 (5th Cir. 2004).
350. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1826, et seq (2017).
351. In the event of a judicial sale resulting from the enforcement of a
mortgage, “[t]he property is sold subject to any real charge or lease with which it
is burdened, superior to any mortgage, lien, or privilege of the seizing creditor.”
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2372 (2017), made applicable to executory proceedings
by art. 2724(A). See also P.J.’s Army Surplus & Co., Inc. v. G.D. & G., 635 So.
2d 1217, 1218 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (“In this case, the question is whether a lease,
recorded after the mortgage upon which the property was foreclosed, survived the
judicial sale without subsequent recordation of a new lease or ratification of the
earlier lease, such that a third party purchaser would be bound by that lease. We
find that it does not.”). See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1,
at § 12-11(c)(1).
352. 52 So. 2d 771 (La. Ct. App. 1951).
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mortgaged property under judicial process dissolves a lease on the
property made and recorded subsequent to the execution and
registry of the mortgage.353
Conversely, if the mineral lease is superior to the lessor’s mortgage (by
reason of recordation prior to the filing of the mortgage or the mortgage
having been subordinated to the mineral lease), the lessee would have no
reason or interest in invoking this provision.
When the lessee invokes this contractual right, the debt sought to be
enforced is tethered to neither volume nor price; it simply represents
monies expended by the lessee for the benefit of its lessor in order to
“discharge any tax, mortgage or other lien,” and is an absolute number.
While, by its terms, the lessee is permitted “to apply to the repayment
of lessee any rentals and/or royalties accruing hereunder,” the lessee would
be well advised to forego the right to be reimbursed out of delay rentals
that might be paid under the mineral lease, limiting the source of repayment
to future royalties accruing under the lease. While both delay rentals and
royalties are certainly “rent,”354 there are significant differences between the
two types of lease maintenance payments.
First, delay rentals are fixed and immutable in amount, while a royalty
varies based upon many factors and considerations. Second, there is an
obligation to pay royalties, but no duty to pay delay rentals (they are
optional to the lessee). Most importantly, the consequence of the nonpayment (or improper payment) of delay rentals is automatic lease
termination,355 while a failure to pay royalties does not result in the ipso
facto termination of the mineral lease.356
Thus, notwithstanding the clarity of this contractual language, a
reduction in the amount of delay rentals (by reason of the lessee availing
this contractual right) is fraught with risk and has the potential to result in

353. Id. at 773.
354. “Payments to the lessor for the maintenance of a mineral lease without
drilling or mining operations or production or for the maintenance of a lease
during the presence on the lease or any land unitized therewith of a well capable
of production in paying quantities, and royalties paid to the lessor on production
are rent.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:123 (1975).
355. Id. at § 31:133. See also Milling, 57 So. 2d at 682; Melancon, 89 So. 2d
at 142 (“In the system of interpretation of oil and gas contracts which this Court
has followed for many years, the lessor’s royalty under the usual oil and gas lease
is placed in the rent category.”).
356. See Acquisitions, Inc. v. Frontier Explorations, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1095 (La.
Ct. App. 1983).
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the expiration of the mineral lease if the lessor were to successfully contend
that its debt paid by the lessee was not a valid debt or incorrect in amount.
C. Recoupment of Prior Overpayments
A lessee might overpay a royalty owner for a variety of reasons.
Examples include title defects that are discovered after a payment is made,
payments made in error, revision of a unit that results in a reduction of the
lessor’s entitled participation in unit production, and other reasons.
When this occurs, the lessee will often seek to adjust future payments
so as to recoup such overpayments, considering it has the right to make
such adjustments. The right of the lessee to recoup overpayments by
withholding from monies owed in the future must be analyzed under the
law of compensation (in other states, often called “offset” or “set-off”).
The Louisiana law of compensation is set forth in article 1893 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, as follows:
Art. 1893. Compensation extinguishes obligations
Compensation takes place by operation of law when two persons
owe to each other sums of money or quantities of fungible things
identical in kind, and these sums or quantities are liquidated and
presently due.
In such a case, compensation extinguishes both obligations to the
extent of the lesser amount.
Delays of grace do not prevent compensation.357
As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated, “[a] debt is said to be liquidated
‘when it is certain what is due and how much is due.’”358 Or, as stated by
another Louisiana court, a “claim is liquidated when its correctness is admitted
by the debtor.”359
However, “it is not necessary that the amount of a debt be fixed in order
for the debt to be considered liquidated. A debt which can be ascertained by
mere calculation or computation in accordance with accepted legal
standards is considered liquidated.”360
357. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1893 (2017).
358. Zibilich v. Rouseo, 103 So. 269, 274 (La. 1925).
359. Sims v. Hays, 521 So. 2d 730, 733 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
360. Arkla, Inc. v. Maddox & May Bros. Casing Serv., 671 So. 2d 1220, 1223
(La. Ct. App. 1996).
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Further commenting on the necessity that the debt be fixed in amount,
the Louisiana Supreme Court said,
The two debts must be equally liquid . . . [A] liquid debt [is] one
whose existence is certain and its quantity determined. A disputed
debt is not liquid and cannot be admitted as susceptible of
compensation unless the one who asserts compensation has in
hand the proof of the existence of the disputed debt and is thus in
a position to prove it promptly.361
The prudent lessee, quite apart from its legal right to be immediately
reimbursed for a legitimate overpayment, would be well-served to recover
the overpayment over a period of time, rather than “all at once,”
particularly if it is justified in knowing that production will support the full
recoupment over time. This allows the lessor to continue to enjoy some
portion of the revenue stream while the lessee is being reimbursed.
However, if the lessee makes the prudent decision to be reimbursed
out of production over time (forgoing the right to be reimbursed at once,
assuming the revenue stream would support it), it should be concerned that
the lessor might sell the leased land to a third party without reserving
minerals thereunder. In such an event, the lessee’s ability to recoup any yet
unrecovered overpayment from the vendee of the lessor is problematic to
say the least. This is so because the lessee’s right to be “made whole” out
of future production is a matter pertaining to movable, not immovable,
property.362
It would be in the interest of the lessee to enter into a written agreement
with the debtor-lessor to acknowledge and affirm the overpayment (in
precise amount); the contractual right of the lessee to be reimbursed out of
future “rent” under the mineral lease; a commitment on the part of the
lessor to tolerate (for lack of a better word) the lessee’s right to be
reimbursed; and an agreement that the lessor will not alienate the land
subject to the lease without either reserving all minerals or requiring the

361. Am. Bank v. Saxena, 553 So. 2d 836, 844 (La. 1989) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
362. “[C]ash is considered a corporeal movable . . . .” Succession of Tebo, 358
So. 2d 337, 339 (La. Ct. App. 1978). Merely because the money is derived from
mineral rights does not change its character. “Money [generated in respect of a
mineral right] is not an immovable. It is movable . . . .” Steinau v. Pyburn, 229
So. 2d 153, 154 (La. Ct. App. 1969).

2017]

CALCULATING THE LESSOR’S ROYALTY PAYMENT

85

vendee of the lessor to expressly acknowledge or assume the lessee’s
continuing right to be reimbursed out of future production.363
D. Withholding of Federal Income Taxes
Applicable rules and regulations of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
require the lessor or other payee of royalties to provide to the lessee or
other payor of proceeds of production a Form W-9 (Request for Taxpayer
Identification Number and Certification), so as to enable the payor to
properly report the amount of royalties paid to a lessor in a given tax year.
The lessee or other payor reports these payments on IRS Form 1099-MISC.
If the lessor fails or refuses to provide the relevant form to the lessee,
the latter is bound to withhold a portion of production (called “backup
withholding”) and remit the same to the IRS. The amount of the backup
withholding is significant–currently twenty-eight percent of the royalty
due to the lessor.364
Because the lessor gets credit for the amount withheld as backup
withholding, this is not a deduction, but essentially a deferral or redirection
of the income to the IRS for the account of the lessor-taxpayer. The
prudent lessor should be motivated to provide the relevant form to the
lessee so as to avoid backup withholding.
All requisite factors or considerations having been identified and
applied to our basic formula, the lessee is now able to calculate the lessor’s
net royalty payment. However, that exercise is meaningless if the lessee
fails to pay the royalty to which its royalty owner is entitled. In that
exceptional situation, consideration must be given to remedies available
to the lessor.
VI. LESSOR’S REMEDIES CONCERNING THE ROYALTY PAYMENT
If the scope and coverage of this article were limited strictly to the
subject matter envisioned by its title, these words would not be written.
The end of the preceding chapter would suffice to close the story on the
methodologies involved in the calculation of the lessor’s royalty payment.
Nevertheless, perhaps as a bit of lagniappe, your author deems it appropriate
to provide a few words to identify the array of remedies available to a lessor
whose royalty payment has not been properly calculated, or has not been
paid at all. Although the coverage of this topic is more superficial than
363. The issue of whether such an agreement should be or would be effective
as to third persons if filed for registry is another matter.
364. 26 U.S.C.A. § 3406 (2008).
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exhaustive, further authorities are identified for the interest of the lessor
concerned with an improper payment of royalties.
If the lessor disagrees with the manner in which its royalty payment
has been calculated, there exists an array of remedies available—some
substantive, some procedural.
A. Notice of Non-payment365
As an overview, before a lessor may file suit against its lessee seeking
dissolution or damages for non-payment of royalties, the lessor must give
the lessee written notice of non-payment and allow the lessee a period of
time to evaluate the demand and respond properly. An array of remedies
is available depending on the manner in which the lessee responds (or fails
to respond), and the facts pertaining to the matter.
B. Prescription
A claim for underpayment or overpayment of royalties (except with
respect to State lands) prescribes in three years.366
If a discrepancy exists between the amount reflected on the royalty
check and the check stub accompanying it, the royalty owner will likely
be charged with the knowledge that it discloses. This knowledge,
conceivably, would be a factor in evaluating whether the lessor, at a date
subsequent to the pertinent prescriptive period, could assert the doctrine
of contra non valentem367 to suspend the three-year liberative prescriptive
period applicable to an action by the royalty owner against its lessee who
has failed to pay the lessor its share of proceeds for mineral production.

365. The topic of non-payment of royalties is another one that could consume
many pages. This subject matter is more fully addressed in Chapter Thirteen of
this author’s Treatise. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1.
366. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3494(5) (2017). See also Hankamer v. Texaco,
Inc., 387 So. 2d 1251, 1254 (La. Ct. App. 1980), writ granted 392 So. 2d 669 (La.
1980), case dismissed 403 So. 2d 651 (La. 1981) (The court sustained an objection
of prescription, saying “the claims for unpaid royalties accruing more than three
years prior to the filing of the suit are prescribed.”).
367. The doctrine of contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio
(typically called “contra non valentem”), suspends the running of prescription
during the period in which the cause of action was not known by or reasonably
knowable to the plaintiff. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note
1, at § 13-41.
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In Wells v. Zadeck,368 the issue was whether an unleased mineral
owner was able to avoid the application of a ten-year prescriptive period
based upon its lack of knowledge and sophistication. The Louisiana
Supreme Court stated that availability of the doctrine of contra non valentem
depends upon “the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s action or inaction in light
of the education, intelligence, and the nature of the defendant’s conduct.”369
The Louisiana Supreme Court further held that the lower courts “clearly
failed to follow the blueprint set forth in Marin [v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48
So. 3d 234 (La. 2010)],”370 by failing to examine the reasonableness of
plaintiff’s actions in light of the circumstances.
Rejecting the lower courts’ judgments, the Court stated:
Taking into consideration Mrs. Wells’ education, intelligence, and
the defendant’s conduct, the conclusion of the lower courts that
Mrs. Wells’ inaction was unreasonable and her ignorance of a
potential claim was attributable to her own neglect is not
supported by the record. Moreover, we agree with the conclusion
in Amoco371 that there is nothing in the jurisprudence requiring the
owner of a mineral servitude to continuously check the property
records to determine if new unitized wells are producing from the
servitude owner’s property.372
Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that “the equitable nature of the
circumstances in each individual case determine the applicability of the
doctrine.”373 Further, under Marin, the record supported a finding that
contra non valentem should apply in such a case.
C. Right to an Accounting374
A lessor who is successful in obtaining a judgment of dissolution of a
mineral lease will often demand an accounting from the lessee. The

368. 89 So. 3d 1145 (La. 2012).
369. Id. at 1151.
370. Id.
371. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 838 So. 2d 821 (La. Ct. App.), writ
denied, 845 So. 2d 1096 (La. 2003) (“The doctrine of contra non valentem halts
the running of prescription when the plaintiff was indeed prevented from filing its
claim under one of the four categories listed [in Marin].”).
372. 89 So. 3d at 1154.
373. Id.
374. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 13-08(g).
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purpose of an accounting is to establish that the lessee has properly and
completely paid to the lessor the monies to which it is entitled.
Even where the lessor is unsuccessful in dissolving a mineral lease,
but the lessee is found to have owed the money to its lessor, the court might
order an accounting.375
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, noted that “at least
in oil and gas lease cancellation cases[,] an accounting is ancillary to the
action and exists for the equitable purpose of adjusting in one proceeding
all the differences between the parties arising from the main cause of
action.”376
The duty to account is a “two-way street.” That is to say, if the lessor
has received funds to which it is not entitled, the lessee has an action to
recover such funds as were unjustifiably paid. Although rarely cited as
codal authority for an accounting, the remedy is embodied in article 2299
of the Louisiana Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 2299. Obligation to restore
A person who has received a payment or a thing not owed to him
is bound to restore it to the person from whom he received it.377
Recovery from the lessor of the “thing not owed” is not precluded by
negligence or error on the part of the lessee-payor. As the courts say it,
“negligence per se is not a bar to recovery for the payment of a thing not
due.”378
Thus, in Matthews v. Sun Exploration & Production Co.,379 the court
observed the following:
Recent jurisprudence has properly interpreted the Code Articles to
provide that negligence per se by a payor is not a bar to recovery
for the payment of a thing not due. (Citations omitted).

375. Harris v. J. C. Trahan Drilling Contractor, Inc., 168 So. 2d 881, 884 (La.
Ct. App. 1964) (“The plaintiffs are, however, entitled to an accounting of royalties
which have accrued or may accrue to them under the terms of the lease.”).
376. Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165, 170, reh’g denied
435 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. Humble Oil & Refining Co.
v. Price, 402 U.S. 934 (1971).
377. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2299 (2017).
378. Dynamic Exploration, Inc. v. Sugar Bowl Gas Corp., 367 So. 2d 18, 24
(La. Ct. App. 1978), writ refused 368 So. 2d 142 (La. 1979).
379. 521 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
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We believe the defendant’s error in overpaying Mrs. Chamberlin
amounted to an ordinary or “honest” mistake as contemplated by
the Civil Code Articles. Consequently, Sun’s error in making the
overpayment does not bar its recovery of these funds.380
Accordingly, it is the fact that money was paid in error, rather than the
reason for the erroneous payment, that establishes the right of restitution.
In the important case of Bourgeois v. Exxon Corp.,381 the lessor’s suit
for dissolution of a mineral lease was denied on the basis of liberative
prescription. The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ demand for an accounting,
stating that “[p]laintiffs’ demand for an accounting of the proceeds of all oil
and gas production is deemed to be ancillary to the main demand and fails
on the same rationale.”382
D. Security for Payment of Royalty
Recalling that the lessor’s royalty constitutes “rent,”383 a powerful
remedy is provided by the Louisiana Mineral Code to the lessor “for the
payment of his rent, and other obligations of the lease.” A right of pledge
on the lessee’s “equipment, machinery, and other property” is provided in
articles 146 through 148 of the Mineral Code. These articles read:
Art. 146. Lessor’s privilege
The lessor of a mineral lease has, for the payment of his rent, and
other obligations of the lease, a right of pledge on all equipment,
machinery, and other property of the lessee on or attached to the
property leased. The right also extends to property of others on or
attached to the property leased by their express or implied consent
in connection with or contemplation of operations on the lease or
land unitized therewith.384
Art. 147. Right to seize property on premises or within fifteen
days of removal
The mineral lessor may seize the property subject to his privilege
before the lessee removes it from the leased premises, or within
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. at 1198.
300 So. 2d 632 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied 303 So. 2d 181 (La. 1974).
Id. at 635.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:123 (1975).
Id. at § 31:146.
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fifteen days after it has been removed by the lessee without the
consent of the lessor, if it continues to be the property of the lessee,
and can be identified.385
Finally, article 148 adds that, “The mineral lessor may enforce his right of
pledge in the same manner as the right of pledge accorded other lessors.”386
E. Production in “Paying Quantities”
Although, properly speaking, it is not a “remedy” for an improper
payment of royalty, brief mention should be made as to the important topic
of production in “paying quantities.” The issue arises when, even
assuming the royalty payment has been properly calculated by the lessee,
the amount of the payment is so minimal as to raise concerns as to whether
the amount of production being obtained (particularly in reference to the
“lifting costs” incurred by the lessee in bringing the production to the
surface) is sufficient to meet the tenets of the “Habendum Clause.”387
A matter regulated by articles 124 and 125 of the Mineral Code,388 the
topic is examined in detail in other writings of this author.389
VII. CONCLUSION
The proper payment of royalties to the lessor is one of the most
important responsibilities of the lessee. The failure to pay royalties, or the
payment of royalties in an improper amount, invites potential significant
remedies to the lessor, including the possibilities of double damages and
lease dissolution.390

385. Id. at § 31:147.
386. Id. at § 31:148. While not frequently invoked, this security device is more
fully examined in the aforementioned Treatise. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE
TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 12-15.
387. The “Habendum Clause” announces the duration of the mineral lease and
is sometimes called the “Thereafter Clause.” All of the distinct clauses in the
mineral lease that address the important issue of lease maintenance come under
the ambit of the “Habendum Clause.” See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE,
supra note 1, at § 4-06(a).
388. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:124-125.
389. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Production in “Paying Quantities”–A Fresh Look,
51 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 24 (2004). Also published at 65 LA. L. REV. 635 (2005).
See also OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at §§ 3-15, 3-16.
390. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 1, at § 13-27, et seq.
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At the core of generating a proper and correct royalty check is the
mathematics inherent in that process of royalty accounting. Addition and
subtraction, as well as multiplication and division, are the essence of the
“mere math” with which this article is concerned. To be sure, more
important than those functions—as important as they might be—are the
factors and considerations involved in identifying the proper elements to
be melded together.
This important function represents an intersection of the science of
mathematics as well as the issues of volume, temperature, gravity and
pressure, and the realities of the production activity itself, in terms of
possible deduction for “post-production costs.” Then the tax collector
visits the scene, resulting in further diminution of the proceeds to which
the lessor is entitled.
Most lessees are prudent and reasonable in the discharge of this
important function. In the exceptional case where the lessee is less than
prudent, appropriate remedies exist in favor of the lessor to rectify the
errors or oversights of the lessee.
It is hoped that this modest work will assist the lessee in discharging
its duties and responsibilities, to avoid even the conversation of these
remedies.

